Stackelberg Equilibrium of Opinion Dynamics Game in Social Network with Two Influence Nodes. / Zhen, Mengke.
In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. 12, 2019, p. 366-386.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Stackelberg Equilibrium of Opinion Dynamics Game in Social Network with Two Influence Nodes.
AU - Zhen, Mengke
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The alteration of opinions of individuals in groups over time is a particular common phenomenon in social life. Taking into account the influence of homogeneous members and some special influential persons, an opinion dynamics game is established. In a social network, two special influence nodes pursuing their certain goals with the process of influencing the opinions of other normal nodes in discrete time is considered. From the perspective of non-cooperation, Stackelberg equilibrium is selected as the solution of the opinion dynamics game. Given distinct information knowledge, players will derive different equilibrium strategies. The open-loop and feedback information configurations are investigated. In the two-person non-cooperative dynamic game, techniques of Pontryagin’s minimum principle and dynamic programming are adopted to derive the equilibrium levels of influence for influence nodes and the equilibrium opinions for other normal nodes in the network. To compute and compare the various equilibrium co
AB - The alteration of opinions of individuals in groups over time is a particular common phenomenon in social life. Taking into account the influence of homogeneous members and some special influential persons, an opinion dynamics game is established. In a social network, two special influence nodes pursuing their certain goals with the process of influencing the opinions of other normal nodes in discrete time is considered. From the perspective of non-cooperation, Stackelberg equilibrium is selected as the solution of the opinion dynamics game. Given distinct information knowledge, players will derive different equilibrium strategies. The open-loop and feedback information configurations are investigated. In the two-person non-cooperative dynamic game, techniques of Pontryagin’s minimum principle and dynamic programming are adopted to derive the equilibrium levels of influence for influence nodes and the equilibrium opinions for other normal nodes in the network. To compute and compare the various equilibrium co
KW - influence
KW - opinion dynamics
KW - social network
KW - Stackelberg equilibrium
KW - influence
KW - opinion dynamics
KW - social network
KW - Stackelberg equilibrium
M3 - Article
VL - 12
SP - 366
EP - 386
JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management
JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management
SN - 2310-2608
ER -
ID: 78456009