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Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. / Tur, A.

2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. p. 265-268.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Harvard

Tur, A 2015, Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. in 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 265-268. https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110

APA

Tur, A. (2015). Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. In 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings (pp. 265-268). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110

Vancouver

Tur A. Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. In 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2015. p. 265-268 https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110

Author

Tur, A. / Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2015. pp. 265-268

BibTeX

@inproceedings{915b60d8fec642e09d75132f2d3b9eb6,
title = "Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs",
abstract = "{\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE. The problem of strategically supported cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games is considered. It is assumed, that the cooperative agreement is reached and each player gets his payoff according to the payoff distribution procedure [5]. Following [3], to punish those who violate this agreement, the special game, which differs from initial only by payoffs of players on cooperative trajectory is constructed. It is shown that in the new game there exists an ε-equilibrium with payoffs of players equal to corresponding payoffs of players in cooperative solution of initial game.",
author = "A. Tur",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781467376983",
pages = "265--268",
booktitle = "2015 International Conference on {"}Stability and Control Processes{"} in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
address = "United States",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs

AU - Tur, A.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - © 2015 IEEE. The problem of strategically supported cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games is considered. It is assumed, that the cooperative agreement is reached and each player gets his payoff according to the payoff distribution procedure [5]. Following [3], to punish those who violate this agreement, the special game, which differs from initial only by payoffs of players on cooperative trajectory is constructed. It is shown that in the new game there exists an ε-equilibrium with payoffs of players equal to corresponding payoffs of players in cooperative solution of initial game.

AB - © 2015 IEEE. The problem of strategically supported cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games is considered. It is assumed, that the cooperative agreement is reached and each player gets his payoff according to the payoff distribution procedure [5]. Following [3], to punish those who violate this agreement, the special game, which differs from initial only by payoffs of players on cooperative trajectory is constructed. It is shown that in the new game there exists an ε-equilibrium with payoffs of players equal to corresponding payoffs of players in cooperative solution of initial game.

U2 - 10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110

DO - 10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781467376983

SP - 265

EP - 268

BT - 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

ER -

ID: 3990350