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Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. / Parilina, Elena; Sedakov, Artem.

International Series in Operations Research and Management Science. ed. / PO Pineau; S Sigue; S Taboubi. Springer Nature, 2020. p. 381-396 (International Series in Operations Research and Management Science; Vol. 280).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Harvard

Parilina, E & Sedakov, A 2020, Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. in PO Pineau, S Sigue & S Taboubi (eds), International Series in Operations Research and Management Science. International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, vol. 280, Springer Nature, pp. 381-396. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21

APA

Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2020). Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. In PO. Pineau, S. Sigue, & S. Taboubi (Eds.), International Series in Operations Research and Management Science (pp. 381-396). (International Series in Operations Research and Management Science; Vol. 280). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21

Vancouver

Parilina E, Sedakov A. Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. In Pineau PO, Sigue S, Taboubi S, editors, International Series in Operations Research and Management Science. Springer Nature. 2020. p. 381-396. (International Series in Operations Research and Management Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21

Author

Parilina, Elena ; Sedakov, Artem. / Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment. International Series in Operations Research and Management Science. editor / PO Pineau ; S Sigue ; S Taboubi. Springer Nature, 2020. pp. 381-396 (International Series in Operations Research and Management Science).

BibTeX

@inbook{d802d84e3aa8412992b646a59e203bd6,
title = "Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment",
abstract = "We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.",
keywords = "Coalition structure, Dynamic competition, Stability",
author = "Elena Parilina and Artem Sedakov",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21",
language = "Английский",
isbn = "978-3-030-19106-1",
series = "International Series in Operations Research and Management Science",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
pages = "381--396",
editor = "PO Pineau and S Sigue and S Taboubi",
booktitle = "International Series in Operations Research and Management Science",
address = "Германия",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Stable Coalition Structures in Dynamic Competitive Environment

AU - Parilina, Elena

AU - Sedakov, Artem

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.

AB - We consider a finite horizon dynamic competition model in discrete time in which firms are not restricted from cooperation with each other and can form coalitions of any size. For every coalition of firms, we determine profits of its members by two approaches: without the redistribution of profits inside the coalition and with such redistribution using a solution from cooperative game theory. Next, for each approach we examine the stability of a coalition structure in the game. When we find a stable coalition structure, we then verify whether it is dynamically stable, that is, stable over time with respect to the same profit distribution method chosen in the initial time period.

KW - Coalition structure

KW - Dynamic competition

KW - Stability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85071304491&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/c48daa14-42eb-3e8a-8262-42f27757082c/

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_21

M3 - глава/раздел

AN - SCOPUS:85071304491

SN - 978-3-030-19106-1

T3 - International Series in Operations Research and Management Science

SP - 381

EP - 396

BT - International Series in Operations Research and Management Science

A2 - Pineau, PO

A2 - Sigue, S

A2 - Taboubi, S

PB - Springer Nature

ER -

ID: 45903677