Standard

Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting. / Zenkevich, N.; Gladkova, M.

2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. 2015. p. 269-272.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research

Harvard

Zenkevich, N & Gladkova, M 2015, Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting. in 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. pp. 269-272, International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, 5/10/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342111

APA

Zenkevich, N., & Gladkova, M. (2015). Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting. In 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings (pp. 269-272) https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342111

Vancouver

Zenkevich N, Gladkova M. Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting. In 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. 2015. p. 269-272 https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342111

Author

Zenkevich, N. ; Gladkova, M. / Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting. 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. 2015. pp. 269-272

BibTeX

@inproceedings{062453a04bc04d18a61f479063a31b77,
title = "Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting",
abstract = "{\textcopyright} 2015 IEEE.The paper considers the market of software products. Regularly this markets are suffering from dealing with a problem of countefeit or pirate products that are sold. Taking this into account the paper is solving the problem of price equilibrium on this market. The software company set the price and the quality of the software product while the countefeit or pirate company suggest the consumers the product of the lower quality. First the general model is analyzed and price equilibrium is defined. Second, the monopoly case is considered separately and optimal software price is defined. Finally, it is supposed that there are two companies that produces original software on the market who differentiate in quality, and there are two pirate companies who produces this software. The duopoly case is analysed and equilibrium prices for competing companies are obtained in the explicit form.",
keywords = "SCOPUS, РИНЦ",
author = "N. Zenkevich and M. Gladkova",
note = "Zenkevich, N. Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting / N. Zenkevich, M. Gladkova // 2015 International Conference on {"}Stability and Control Processes{"} in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. - 2015. - P. 269-272. ; International Conference on {"}Stability and Control Processes{"} in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 ; Conference date: 05-10-2015 Through 09-10-2015",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1109/SCP.2015.7342111",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781467376983",
pages = "269--272",
booktitle = "2015 International Conference on {"}Stability and Control Processes{"} in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings",
url = "http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2015/openconf.php",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting

AU - Zenkevich, N.

AU - Gladkova, M.

N1 - Zenkevich, N. Software price equilibrium under counterfeiting / N. Zenkevich, M. Gladkova // 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings. - 2015. - P. 269-272.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - © 2015 IEEE.The paper considers the market of software products. Regularly this markets are suffering from dealing with a problem of countefeit or pirate products that are sold. Taking this into account the paper is solving the problem of price equilibrium on this market. The software company set the price and the quality of the software product while the countefeit or pirate company suggest the consumers the product of the lower quality. First the general model is analyzed and price equilibrium is defined. Second, the monopoly case is considered separately and optimal software price is defined. Finally, it is supposed that there are two companies that produces original software on the market who differentiate in quality, and there are two pirate companies who produces this software. The duopoly case is analysed and equilibrium prices for competing companies are obtained in the explicit form.

AB - © 2015 IEEE.The paper considers the market of software products. Regularly this markets are suffering from dealing with a problem of countefeit or pirate products that are sold. Taking this into account the paper is solving the problem of price equilibrium on this market. The software company set the price and the quality of the software product while the countefeit or pirate company suggest the consumers the product of the lower quality. First the general model is analyzed and price equilibrium is defined. Second, the monopoly case is considered separately and optimal software price is defined. Finally, it is supposed that there are two companies that produces original software on the market who differentiate in quality, and there are two pirate companies who produces this software. The duopoly case is analysed and equilibrium prices for competing companies are obtained in the explicit form.

KW - SCOPUS

KW - РИНЦ

U2 - 10.1109/SCP.2015.7342111

DO - 10.1109/SCP.2015.7342111

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9781467376983

SP - 269

EP - 272

BT - 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings

T2 - International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015

Y2 - 5 October 2015 through 9 October 2015

ER -

ID: 4003662