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Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation. / Naumova, Natalia.

In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2050001, 09.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Naumova, N 2020, 'Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation', International Game Theory Review, vol. 22, no. 3, 2050001. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500012

APA

Naumova, N. (2020). Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation. International Game Theory Review, 22(3), [2050001]. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500012

Vancouver

Naumova N. Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation. International Game Theory Review. 2020 Sep;22(3). 2050001. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500012

Author

Naumova, Natalia. / Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation. In: International Game Theory Review. 2020 ; Vol. 22, No. 3.

BibTeX

@article{fd69a58d591e44f9bc77a1146817f2d0,
title = "Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation",
abstract = "Generalizations of reactive and semi-reactive bargaining sets of TU games are defined for the case when objections and counter-objections are permitted not between singletons but between elements of a family of coalitions and can use coalitions from B. Necessary and sufficient conditions on , B that ensure existence results for generalizations of the reactive bargaining set and of the semi-reactive barganing set at each TU game (N,v) with nonnegative values are obtained. The existence conditions for the generalized reactive bargaining set do not coincide with existence conditions for the generalized kernel and coincide with conditions for the generalized semi-reactive bargaining set only if |N|≤ 4 and B = 2N. The conditions for the generalized semi-reactive bargaining set coincide with conditions for the generalized classical bargaining set that were described in the previous papers of the author. For monotonic B, the condition on for existence of the generalized semi-reactive bargaining sets on the class of games with nonnegative values is also necessary and sufficient on the class of simple games, but similar result for the generalized classical bargaining sets is proved only for |N|≤ 6.",
keywords = "bargaining set, Cooperative game, kernel, reactive bargaining set, semi-reactive bargaining set",
author = "Natalia Naumova",
year = "2020",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1142/S0219198920500012",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reactive and Semi-Reactive Bargaining Sets for Games with Restricted Cooperation

AU - Naumova, Natalia

PY - 2020/9

Y1 - 2020/9

N2 - Generalizations of reactive and semi-reactive bargaining sets of TU games are defined for the case when objections and counter-objections are permitted not between singletons but between elements of a family of coalitions and can use coalitions from B. Necessary and sufficient conditions on , B that ensure existence results for generalizations of the reactive bargaining set and of the semi-reactive barganing set at each TU game (N,v) with nonnegative values are obtained. The existence conditions for the generalized reactive bargaining set do not coincide with existence conditions for the generalized kernel and coincide with conditions for the generalized semi-reactive bargaining set only if |N|≤ 4 and B = 2N. The conditions for the generalized semi-reactive bargaining set coincide with conditions for the generalized classical bargaining set that were described in the previous papers of the author. For monotonic B, the condition on for existence of the generalized semi-reactive bargaining sets on the class of games with nonnegative values is also necessary and sufficient on the class of simple games, but similar result for the generalized classical bargaining sets is proved only for |N|≤ 6.

AB - Generalizations of reactive and semi-reactive bargaining sets of TU games are defined for the case when objections and counter-objections are permitted not between singletons but between elements of a family of coalitions and can use coalitions from B. Necessary and sufficient conditions on , B that ensure existence results for generalizations of the reactive bargaining set and of the semi-reactive barganing set at each TU game (N,v) with nonnegative values are obtained. The existence conditions for the generalized reactive bargaining set do not coincide with existence conditions for the generalized kernel and coincide with conditions for the generalized semi-reactive bargaining set only if |N|≤ 4 and B = 2N. The conditions for the generalized semi-reactive bargaining set coincide with conditions for the generalized classical bargaining set that were described in the previous papers of the author. For monotonic B, the condition on for existence of the generalized semi-reactive bargaining sets on the class of games with nonnegative values is also necessary and sufficient on the class of simple games, but similar result for the generalized classical bargaining sets is proved only for |N|≤ 6.

KW - bargaining set

KW - Cooperative game

KW - kernel

KW - reactive bargaining set

KW - semi-reactive bargaining set

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078422561&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/b713f719-aa5c-39d4-9882-0ecf00e029bd/

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198920500012

DO - 10.1142/S0219198920500012

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85078422561

VL - 22

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 3

M1 - 2050001

ER -

ID: 51656349