Payment schemes for finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games

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Payment schemes for finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. / Парилина, Елена Михайловна ; Писарева, Алёна Максимовна; Zaccour, Georges.

In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 99, No. 1-2, 01.09.2025, p. 461-490.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{024bfdb71e6d456ab3b48bd216f6d1b2,

title = "Payment schemes for finitely repeated Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma games",

abstract = "In the paper we consider finitely repeated Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma and propose the method of sustaining cooperation based on the ε-equilibrium in limited retaliation behavior strategies. The main feature of this strategy is that the punishment of a deviated player does not necessarily last until the end of the game. The duration of punishment depends on the stage when deviation happens and it is not uniquely defined. We propose two payment schemes along the cooperative trajectory to sustain cooperation based on limited retaliation strategies. If the payments in the game are organized following these schemes, when they exist, then players have no incentive to deviate and cooperation is sustainable against individual deviations.",

keywords = "Cooperation, Limited retaliation, Payment schemes, Prisoner{\textquoteright}s Dilemma, Repeated games",

author = "Парилина, {Елена Михайловна} and Писарева, {Алёна Максимовна} and Georges Zaccour",

year = "2025",

month = sep,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s11238-025-10048-w",

language = "English",

volume = "99",

pages = "461--490",

journal = "Theory and Decision",

issn = "0040-5833",

publisher = "Springer Nature",

number = "1-2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Payment schemes for finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games

AU - Парилина, Елена Михайловна

AU - Писарева, Алёна Максимовна

AU - Zaccour, Georges

PY - 2025/9/1

Y1 - 2025/9/1

N2 - In the paper we consider finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and propose the method of sustaining cooperation based on the ε-equilibrium in limited retaliation behavior strategies. The main feature of this strategy is that the punishment of a deviated player does not necessarily last until the end of the game. The duration of punishment depends on the stage when deviation happens and it is not uniquely defined. We propose two payment schemes along the cooperative trajectory to sustain cooperation based on limited retaliation strategies. If the payments in the game are organized following these schemes, when they exist, then players have no incentive to deviate and cooperation is sustainable against individual deviations.

AB - In the paper we consider finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and propose the method of sustaining cooperation based on the ε-equilibrium in limited retaliation behavior strategies. The main feature of this strategy is that the punishment of a deviated player does not necessarily last until the end of the game. The duration of punishment depends on the stage when deviation happens and it is not uniquely defined. We propose two payment schemes along the cooperative trajectory to sustain cooperation based on limited retaliation strategies. If the payments in the game are organized following these schemes, when they exist, then players have no incentive to deviate and cooperation is sustainable against individual deviations.

KW - Cooperation

KW - Limited retaliation

KW - Payment schemes

KW - Prisoner’s Dilemma

KW - Repeated games

UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-025-10048-w

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/78512364-2dc7-3d90-93e0-508bcccb4585/

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-025-10048-w

DO - 10.1007/s11238-025-10048-w

M3 - Article

VL - 99

SP - 461

EP - 490

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 1-2

ER -

ID: 137653999