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ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. 8, 2015, p. 347-360.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2015, 'ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES', Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. 8, pp. 347-360.

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2015). ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 8, 347-360.

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES. Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2015;8:347-360.

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2015 ; Vol. 8. pp. 347-360.

BibTeX

@article{44f9aa266170458aa9e5ec6b92de6545,
title = "ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES",
abstract = "In cooperative dynamic games a stringent condition - subgame consistency - is required for a dynamically stable solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset remains in effect in any subgame starting at a later stage with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior. Hence the players do not have incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. Yeung and Petrosyan (2015) provided subgame consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games with non-transferable payoffs/utility (NTU) using a variable payoffs weights scheme is analyzed. This paper extends their analysis to a stochastic dynamic framework. A solution mechanism for characterizing subgame consistent solutions is derived. The use of a variable payoff weights scheme allows the derivation of subgame consistent solutions under a wide range of optimality principles.",
keywords = "STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES, SUBGAME CONSISTENT COOPERATIVE SOLUTION, VARIABLE PAYOff WEIGHTS",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "347--360",
journal = "Contributions to Game Theory and Management",
issn = "2310-2608",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - ON SUBGAME CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR NTU COOPERATIVE STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - In cooperative dynamic games a stringent condition - subgame consistency - is required for a dynamically stable solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset remains in effect in any subgame starting at a later stage with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior. Hence the players do not have incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. Yeung and Petrosyan (2015) provided subgame consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games with non-transferable payoffs/utility (NTU) using a variable payoffs weights scheme is analyzed. This paper extends their analysis to a stochastic dynamic framework. A solution mechanism for characterizing subgame consistent solutions is derived. The use of a variable payoff weights scheme allows the derivation of subgame consistent solutions under a wide range of optimality principles.

AB - In cooperative dynamic games a stringent condition - subgame consistency - is required for a dynamically stable solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if the optimality principle agreed upon at the outset remains in effect in any subgame starting at a later stage with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior. Hence the players do not have incentives to deviate from the previously adopted optimal behavior. Yeung and Petrosyan (2015) provided subgame consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games with non-transferable payoffs/utility (NTU) using a variable payoffs weights scheme is analyzed. This paper extends their analysis to a stochastic dynamic framework. A solution mechanism for characterizing subgame consistent solutions is derived. The use of a variable payoff weights scheme allows the derivation of subgame consistent solutions under a wide range of optimality principles.

KW - STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES

KW - SUBGAME CONSISTENT COOPERATIVE SOLUTION

KW - VARIABLE PAYOff WEIGHTS

UR - https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=23746008

M3 - Article

VL - 8

SP - 347

EP - 360

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -

ID: 5799354