Links

DOI

In the paper, non-cooperative and cooperative versions of repeated rhomboidal games with hierarchical structure are investigated. In non-cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStability and Control Processes
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the 4th International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages447-455
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-87966-2
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-87965-5
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
EventStability and Control Processes: International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov: Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov - Санкт-Петербургский Государственный Университет, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation
Duration: 5 Oct 2020 → 9 Oct 2020
Conference number: 4
http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2020/
http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2020/ru/main/
http://www.apmath.spbu.ru/scp2020/eng/program/#schedule
https://link.springer.com/conference/scp

Publication series

Name Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences - Proceedings

Conference

ConferenceStability and Control Processes: International Conference Dedicated to the Memory of Professor Vladimir Zubov
Abbreviated titleSCP2020
Country/TerritoryRussian Federation
CitySaint Petersburg
Period5/10/20 → 9/10/20
Internet address

ID: 95497995