Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research
Nucleolus as a Selector of Subcore. / Zakharov, V.V.; Akimova, A.N.
11th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of Optimization 2000, St Petersburg, Russia, 3-6 July 2000. Elsevier, 2000. p. 675-680 (IFAC Proceedings Volumes; Vol. 33, No. 16).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research
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TY - GEN
T1 - Nucleolus as a Selector of Subcore
AU - Zakharov, V.V.
AU - Akimova, A.N.
N1 - Conference code: 11
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - In this paper TU-cooperative games are considered from the linear programming point of view. Using the linear programming approach for construction of subcore and grand subcore, which are multiple selectors of the core, we represent them in analytical forms. The investigation of subcore's properties illustrates the possibility to obtain more simple conditions to check whether an arbitrary one point solution lies in the core and subcore. Two solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic-function form, the nucleolus and Shapley value, are studied in their relationship to the grand subcore in symmetrical n-person TU-cooperative games. Under additional restrictions for the structure of optimal solutions’ set of considered linear programming problem sufficient conditions have been obtained for the nucleolus to be a selector of the grand subcore.
AB - In this paper TU-cooperative games are considered from the linear programming point of view. Using the linear programming approach for construction of subcore and grand subcore, which are multiple selectors of the core, we represent them in analytical forms. The investigation of subcore's properties illustrates the possibility to obtain more simple conditions to check whether an arbitrary one point solution lies in the core and subcore. Two solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic-function form, the nucleolus and Shapley value, are studied in their relationship to the grand subcore in symmetrical n-person TU-cooperative games. Under additional restrictions for the structure of optimal solutions’ set of considered linear programming problem sufficient conditions have been obtained for the nucleolus to be a selector of the grand subcore.
KW - co-operation
KW - game theory
KW - linear programming
U2 - 10.1016/S1474-6670(17)39714-8
DO - 10.1016/S1474-6670(17)39714-8
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - IFAC Proceedings Volumes
SP - 675
EP - 680
BT - 11th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of Optimization 2000, St Petersburg, Russia, 3-6 July 2000
PB - Elsevier
T2 - 11th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of Optimization (CAO 2000)
Y2 - 3 July 2000 through 6 July 2000
ER -
ID: 26453156