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Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer Nature, 2018. p. 633-670.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2018, Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games. in Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer Nature, pp. 633-670. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_13

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2018). Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games. In Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory (pp. 633-670). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_13

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games. In Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer Nature. 2018. p. 633-670 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_13

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games. Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer Nature, 2018. pp. 633-670

BibTeX

@inbook{7aae48bbbc294e66aba8430ec5cab34e,
title = "Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games",
abstract = "Cooperation in an inter-temporal framework under nontransferable utility/payoffs (NTU) presents a highly challenging and extremely intriguing task to game theorists. This chapter provides a coherent analysis on NTU cooperative dynamic games. The formulations of NTU cooperative dynamic games in continuous time and in discrete time are provided. The issues of individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and an individual player's payoff under cooperation are presented. Monitoring and threat strategies preventing the breakup of the cooperative scheme are presented. Maintaining the agreed-upon optimality principle in effect throughout the game horizon plays an important role in the sustainability of cooperative schemes. The notion of time (subgame optimal trajectory) consistency in NTU differential games is expounded. Subgame consistent solutions in NTU cooperative differential games and subgame consistent solutions via variable payoff weights in NTU cooperative dynamic games are provided.",
keywords = "Cooperative games, Differential games, Dynamic games, Group optimality, Individual rationality, Nontransferable utility, Optimality principle, Subgame consistency, Time consistency, Variable weights",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
year = "2018",
month = aug,
day = "12",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_13",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319443737",
pages = "633--670",
booktitle = "Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
address = "Germany",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Nontransferable utility cooperative dynamic games

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

PY - 2018/8/12

Y1 - 2018/8/12

N2 - Cooperation in an inter-temporal framework under nontransferable utility/payoffs (NTU) presents a highly challenging and extremely intriguing task to game theorists. This chapter provides a coherent analysis on NTU cooperative dynamic games. The formulations of NTU cooperative dynamic games in continuous time and in discrete time are provided. The issues of individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and an individual player's payoff under cooperation are presented. Monitoring and threat strategies preventing the breakup of the cooperative scheme are presented. Maintaining the agreed-upon optimality principle in effect throughout the game horizon plays an important role in the sustainability of cooperative schemes. The notion of time (subgame optimal trajectory) consistency in NTU differential games is expounded. Subgame consistent solutions in NTU cooperative differential games and subgame consistent solutions via variable payoff weights in NTU cooperative dynamic games are provided.

AB - Cooperation in an inter-temporal framework under nontransferable utility/payoffs (NTU) presents a highly challenging and extremely intriguing task to game theorists. This chapter provides a coherent analysis on NTU cooperative dynamic games. The formulations of NTU cooperative dynamic games in continuous time and in discrete time are provided. The issues of individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and an individual player's payoff under cooperation are presented. Monitoring and threat strategies preventing the breakup of the cooperative scheme are presented. Maintaining the agreed-upon optimality principle in effect throughout the game horizon plays an important role in the sustainability of cooperative schemes. The notion of time (subgame optimal trajectory) consistency in NTU differential games is expounded. Subgame consistent solutions in NTU cooperative differential games and subgame consistent solutions via variable payoff weights in NTU cooperative dynamic games are provided.

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Differential games

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Group optimality

KW - Individual rationality

KW - Nontransferable utility

KW - Optimality principle

KW - Subgame consistency

KW - Time consistency

KW - Variable weights

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85063047040&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_13

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_13

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85063047040

SN - 9783319443737

SP - 633

EP - 670

BT - Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory

PB - Springer Nature

ER -

ID: 40031741