Standard

Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency. / Naumova, N. I.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 33, No. 4, 01.11.2005, p. 523-534.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Harvard

Naumova, NI 2005, 'Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 523-534. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0216-6

APA

Naumova, N. I. (2005). Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency. International Journal of Game Theory, 33(4), 523-534. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0216-6

Vancouver

Naumova NI. Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency. International Journal of Game Theory. 2005 Nov 1;33(4):523-534. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0216-6

Author

Naumova, N. I. / Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 2005 ; Vol. 33, No. 4. pp. 523-534.

BibTeX

@article{6091cd89281b47f19a801f76dde1195d,
title = "Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency",
abstract = "Let f be a single valued solution for cooperative TU games that satisfies inessential game property, efficiency, Hart Mas-Colell consistency and for two person games is strictly monotonic and individually unbounded. Then there exists a family of strictly increasing functions associated with players that completely determines f. For two person games, both players have equal differences between their functions at the solution point and at the values of characteristic function of their singletons. This solution for two person games is uniquely extended to n person games due to consistency and efficiency. The extension uses the potential with respect to the family of functions and generalizes potentials introduced by Hart and Mas Colell [6]. The weighted Shapley values, the proportional value described by Ortmann [11], and new values generated by power functions are among these solutions.",
keywords = "Claim problem, Consistency, Potential, Shapley value",
author = "Naumova, {N. I.}",
year = "2005",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-005-0216-6",
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "523--534",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency

AU - Naumova, N. I.

PY - 2005/11/1

Y1 - 2005/11/1

N2 - Let f be a single valued solution for cooperative TU games that satisfies inessential game property, efficiency, Hart Mas-Colell consistency and for two person games is strictly monotonic and individually unbounded. Then there exists a family of strictly increasing functions associated with players that completely determines f. For two person games, both players have equal differences between their functions at the solution point and at the values of characteristic function of their singletons. This solution for two person games is uniquely extended to n person games due to consistency and efficiency. The extension uses the potential with respect to the family of functions and generalizes potentials introduced by Hart and Mas Colell [6]. The weighted Shapley values, the proportional value described by Ortmann [11], and new values generated by power functions are among these solutions.

AB - Let f be a single valued solution for cooperative TU games that satisfies inessential game property, efficiency, Hart Mas-Colell consistency and for two person games is strictly monotonic and individually unbounded. Then there exists a family of strictly increasing functions associated with players that completely determines f. For two person games, both players have equal differences between their functions at the solution point and at the values of characteristic function of their singletons. This solution for two person games is uniquely extended to n person games due to consistency and efficiency. The extension uses the potential with respect to the family of functions and generalizes potentials introduced by Hart and Mas Colell [6]. The weighted Shapley values, the proportional value described by Ortmann [11], and new values generated by power functions are among these solutions.

KW - Claim problem

KW - Consistency

KW - Potential

KW - Shapley value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=27644558181&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-005-0216-6

DO - 10.1007/s00182-005-0216-6

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:27644558181

VL - 33

SP - 523

EP - 534

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 52885875