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Multistage games. / Grauer, LV; Petrosyan, LA.

In: Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2004, p. 597-605.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Grauer, LV & Petrosyan, LA 2004, 'Multistage games', Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 597-605. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jappmathmech.2004.07.012

APA

Grauer, LV., & Petrosyan, LA. (2004). Multistage games. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, 68(4), 597-605. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jappmathmech.2004.07.012

Vancouver

Grauer LV, Petrosyan LA. Multistage games. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics. 2004;68(4):597-605. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jappmathmech.2004.07.012

Author

Grauer, LV ; Petrosyan, LA. / Multistage games. In: Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics. 2004 ; Vol. 68, No. 4. pp. 597-605.

BibTeX

@article{5d429de1c6924884a6d84a262f0f9b34,
title = "Multistage games",
abstract = "Infinite stage and finite stage games are considered in a tree-like graph in which a certain simultaneous game corresponds to each vertex. A definition of a strong Nash transferable equilibrium is given. In the case of infinite stage games, a regularization procedure is introduced which enables a strong transferable equilibrium to be constructed. A strong transferable equilibrium is found in explicit form for the specific case o the n-person, repeated, infinite stage {"}Prisoner's dilemma{"} game. A new class of Nash equilibria, based on the use of penalty strategies, is defined in the case of finite stage games. Explicit analytical formulae are obtained for the number of stages required for the penalty. It is shown that the payoffs in a given equilibrium exceed the payoffs in the classical absolute equilibrium. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.",
author = "LV Grauer and LA Petrosyan",
year = "2004",
doi = "10.1016/j.jappmathmech.2004.07.012",
language = "Английский",
volume = "68",
pages = "597--605",
journal = "Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics",
issn = "0021-8928",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multistage games

AU - Grauer, LV

AU - Petrosyan, LA

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - Infinite stage and finite stage games are considered in a tree-like graph in which a certain simultaneous game corresponds to each vertex. A definition of a strong Nash transferable equilibrium is given. In the case of infinite stage games, a regularization procedure is introduced which enables a strong transferable equilibrium to be constructed. A strong transferable equilibrium is found in explicit form for the specific case o the n-person, repeated, infinite stage "Prisoner's dilemma" game. A new class of Nash equilibria, based on the use of penalty strategies, is defined in the case of finite stage games. Explicit analytical formulae are obtained for the number of stages required for the penalty. It is shown that the payoffs in a given equilibrium exceed the payoffs in the classical absolute equilibrium. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

AB - Infinite stage and finite stage games are considered in a tree-like graph in which a certain simultaneous game corresponds to each vertex. A definition of a strong Nash transferable equilibrium is given. In the case of infinite stage games, a regularization procedure is introduced which enables a strong transferable equilibrium to be constructed. A strong transferable equilibrium is found in explicit form for the specific case o the n-person, repeated, infinite stage "Prisoner's dilemma" game. A new class of Nash equilibria, based on the use of penalty strategies, is defined in the case of finite stage games. Explicit analytical formulae are obtained for the number of stages required for the penalty. It is shown that the payoffs in a given equilibrium exceed the payoffs in the classical absolute equilibrium. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=12244285693&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.jappmathmech.2004.07.012

DO - 10.1016/j.jappmathmech.2004.07.012

M3 - статья

AN - SCOPUS:12244285693

VL - 68

SP - 597

EP - 605

JO - Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics

JF - Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics

SN - 0021-8928

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 40031825