Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research › peer-review
Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers : Evolutionary Approach. / Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.; Gubar, Elena A.; Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.; Kurnosykh, Zlata; Skovorodina, Tatiana.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X. ed. / LA Petrosyan; NA Zenkevich. Vol. 10 Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета, 2017. p. 100-128 (Contributions to Game Theory and Management; Vol. 10).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research › peer-review
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TY - GEN
T1 - Modelling of Information Spreading in the Population of Taxpayers
AU - Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.
AU - Gubar, Elena A.
AU - Zhitkova, Ekaterina M.
AU - Kurnosykh, Zlata
AU - Skovorodina, Tatiana
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.
AB - Information technologies such as social networks and Internet allow to spread ideas, rumors, advertisements and information effectively and widely. Here we use this fact to describe two different approach of evaluation the impact of information on the members of tax system. We consider an impact of spreading information about future audits of the tax authorities in a population of taxpayers. It is assumed that all agents pay taxes, if they know that the probability of a tax audit is high. However some agents can hide their true income and then such behavior provokes the tax audit. Each agent adopts her behavior to the received information of future audits, which depends on the behavior of other agents.Firstly, we model a process of propagation information as an epidemic process and combine it with game between tax authority and taxpayers. Secondly, we consider evolutionary game on network which define structured population of taxpayers and evaluate the impact of the spreading of information on the changes of population states over the time.We formulate mathematical models, analyze the behavior of agents and corroborate all results with numerical simulations.
KW - tax audit
KW - tax evasion
KW - total tax revenue
KW - information spreading
KW - evolutionary game on networks
KW - TAX COMPLIANCE
KW - ENFORCEMENT
KW - SOCIETY
KW - EVASION
M3 - статья в сборнике материалов конференции
SN - *****************
VL - 10
T3 - Contributions to Game Theory and Management
SP - 100
EP - 128
BT - CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL X
A2 - Petrosyan, LA
A2 - Zenkevich, NA
PB - Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета
Y2 - 7 July 2016 through 9 July 2016
ER -
ID: 48578236