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Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior. / Sokolovskyi, Dmytro; Sokolovska, Olena.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH. ed. / L Furova; D Spalkova. Masaryk University Press, 2013. p. 295-303.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Harvard

Sokolovskyi, D & Sokolovska, O 2013, Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior. in L Furova & D Spalkova (eds), PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH. Masaryk University Press, pp. 295-303, 17th International Conference on Current Trends in Public Sector Research, Slapanice, Czech Republic, 17/01/13.

APA

Sokolovskyi, D., & Sokolovska, O. (2013). Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior. In L. Furova, & D. Spalkova (Eds.), PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH (pp. 295-303). Masaryk University Press.

Vancouver

Sokolovskyi D, Sokolovska O. Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior. In Furova L, Spalkova D, editors, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH. Masaryk University Press. 2013. p. 295-303

Author

Sokolovskyi, Dmytro ; Sokolovska, Olena. / Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH. editor / L Furova ; D Spalkova. Masaryk University Press, 2013. pp. 295-303

BibTeX

@inproceedings{e8d26714b6734029958b424b0dc7bc72,
title = "Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior",
abstract = "This paper aims to propose the approach to classify the industries in terms of easiness of tax evasion. Based on assumptions of taxpayer's behavior, our results allow defining the type of dependence of real tax rates on their nominal ones. We find that the graph, describing the taxpayer's behavior, has two key points: maximum - the optimal tax rate (if this rate increase, the real tax revenues fall), and also the point of simple reproduction (after achieving this level, firms stop to pay taxes at all with appropriate shifting into informal sector or closing down). I.e. two key levels of tax burden: optimal and zero can be defined. The values of those parameters for taxpayers operating in different groups of industries were calculated.",
keywords = "Lax burden, economic behavior, tax evasion, game theory, EVASION",
author = "Dmytro Sokolovskyi and Olena Sokolovska",
year = "2013",
language = "Английский",
pages = "295--303",
editor = "L Furova and D Spalkova",
booktitle = "PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH",
publisher = "Masaryk University Press",
address = "Чехия",
note = "null ; Conference date: 17-01-2013 Through 18-01-2013",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Modeling of Tax Policy Influence on Taxpayers' Behavior

AU - Sokolovskyi, Dmytro

AU - Sokolovska, Olena

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - This paper aims to propose the approach to classify the industries in terms of easiness of tax evasion. Based on assumptions of taxpayer's behavior, our results allow defining the type of dependence of real tax rates on their nominal ones. We find that the graph, describing the taxpayer's behavior, has two key points: maximum - the optimal tax rate (if this rate increase, the real tax revenues fall), and also the point of simple reproduction (after achieving this level, firms stop to pay taxes at all with appropriate shifting into informal sector or closing down). I.e. two key levels of tax burden: optimal and zero can be defined. The values of those parameters for taxpayers operating in different groups of industries were calculated.

AB - This paper aims to propose the approach to classify the industries in terms of easiness of tax evasion. Based on assumptions of taxpayer's behavior, our results allow defining the type of dependence of real tax rates on their nominal ones. We find that the graph, describing the taxpayer's behavior, has two key points: maximum - the optimal tax rate (if this rate increase, the real tax revenues fall), and also the point of simple reproduction (after achieving this level, firms stop to pay taxes at all with appropriate shifting into informal sector or closing down). I.e. two key levels of tax burden: optimal and zero can be defined. The values of those parameters for taxpayers operating in different groups of industries were calculated.

KW - Lax burden

KW - economic behavior

KW - tax evasion

KW - game theory

KW - EVASION

M3 - статья в сборнике материалов конференции

SP - 295

EP - 303

BT - PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CURRENT TRENDS IN PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH

A2 - Furova, L

A2 - Spalkova, D

PB - Masaryk University Press

Y2 - 17 January 2013 through 18 January 2013

ER -

ID: 17648946