Standard

Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption. / Kolokoltsov, V. N.; Malafeyev, O. A.

In: Dynamic Games and Applications, Vol. 7, No. 1, 03.2017, p. 34-47.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Kolokoltsov, VN & Malafeyev, OA 2017, 'Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption', Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 34-47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x

APA

Kolokoltsov, V. N., & Malafeyev, O. A. (2017). Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption. Dynamic Games and Applications, 7(1), 34-47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x

Vancouver

Kolokoltsov VN, Malafeyev OA. Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2017 Mar;7(1):34-47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x

Author

Kolokoltsov, V. N. ; Malafeyev, O. A. / Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption. In: Dynamic Games and Applications. 2017 ; Vol. 7, No. 1. pp. 34-47.

BibTeX

@article{20acc3beedc64c33bc07c0db551c0427,
title = "Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption",
abstract = "A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an exactly solvable model of mean-field-game type. The results show clearly how the presence of interaction (including social norms) influences the spread of corruption by creating certain phase transition from one to three equilibria.",
keywords = "Corruption, Mean-field games, Stable equilibria, Social norms, Phase transition, PETTY CORRUPTION, CONVERGENCE, EQUILIBRIA, AGENTS",
author = "Kolokoltsov, {V. N.} and Malafeyev, {O. A.}",
year = "2017",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x",
language = "Английский",
volume = "7",
pages = "34--47",
journal = "Dynamic Games and Applications",
issn = "2153-0785",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption

AU - Kolokoltsov, V. N.

AU - Malafeyev, O. A.

PY - 2017/3

Y1 - 2017/3

N2 - A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an exactly solvable model of mean-field-game type. The results show clearly how the presence of interaction (including social norms) influences the spread of corruption by creating certain phase transition from one to three equilibria.

AB - A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an exactly solvable model of mean-field-game type. The results show clearly how the presence of interaction (including social norms) influences the spread of corruption by creating certain phase transition from one to three equilibria.

KW - Corruption

KW - Mean-field games

KW - Stable equilibria

KW - Social norms

KW - Phase transition

KW - PETTY CORRUPTION

KW - CONVERGENCE

KW - EQUILIBRIA

KW - AGENTS

UR - https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=29484462

U2 - 10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x

DO - 10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x

M3 - статья

VL - 7

SP - 34

EP - 47

JO - Dynamic Games and Applications

JF - Dynamic Games and Applications

SN - 2153-0785

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 5806252