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Marginalist and efficient values for TU games. / Khmelnitskaya, AB.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 1, 07.1999, p. 45-54.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Khmelnitskaya, AB 1999, 'Marginalist and efficient values for TU games', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 45-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6

APA

Khmelnitskaya, AB. (1999). Marginalist and efficient values for TU games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 38(1), 45-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6

Vancouver

Khmelnitskaya AB. Marginalist and efficient values for TU games. Mathematical Social Sciences. 1999 Jul;38(1):45-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6

Author

Khmelnitskaya, AB. / Marginalist and efficient values for TU games. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 1999 ; Vol. 38, No. 1. pp. 45-54.

BibTeX

@article{1b3e2500fa174caba8df296c7f602f05,
title = "Marginalist and efficient values for TU games",
abstract = "We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which possesses the null-player property and is either continuous or monotonic. We show that every such value has to be additive and covariant as well. It follows that the set of all marginalist, efficient, and monotonic values possessing the null-player property coincides with the set of random-order values, and, thereby, the last statement provides an axiomatization without the linearity axiom for the latter which is similar to that of Young for the Shapley value. Another axiomatization without linearity for random-order values is provided by marginalism, efficiency, monotonicity and covariance. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "Axiomatic characterization, Efficiency, Marginalism, Transferable utility game, Value",
author = "AB Khmelnitskaya",
year = "1999",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6",
language = "Английский",
volume = "38",
pages = "45--54",
journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",
issn = "0165-4896",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Marginalist and efficient values for TU games

AU - Khmelnitskaya, AB

PY - 1999/7

Y1 - 1999/7

N2 - We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which possesses the null-player property and is either continuous or monotonic. We show that every such value has to be additive and covariant as well. It follows that the set of all marginalist, efficient, and monotonic values possessing the null-player property coincides with the set of random-order values, and, thereby, the last statement provides an axiomatization without the linearity axiom for the latter which is similar to that of Young for the Shapley value. Another axiomatization without linearity for random-order values is provided by marginalism, efficiency, monotonicity and covariance. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which possesses the null-player property and is either continuous or monotonic. We show that every such value has to be additive and covariant as well. It follows that the set of all marginalist, efficient, and monotonic values possessing the null-player property coincides with the set of random-order values, and, thereby, the last statement provides an axiomatization without the linearity axiom for the latter which is similar to that of Young for the Shapley value. Another axiomatization without linearity for random-order values is provided by marginalism, efficiency, monotonicity and covariance. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Axiomatic characterization

KW - Efficiency

KW - Marginalism

KW - Transferable utility game

KW - Value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0042545069&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6

DO - 10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6

M3 - статья

AN - SCOPUS:0042545069

VL - 38

SP - 45

EP - 54

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 41479093