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Integrality Gap of Nash Welfare Maximization with Money. / Дементьев, Юрий Ильич; Гравин, Николай; Игнатьев, Артур Андреевич.

ECAI 2025. 2025.

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Дементьев, ЮИ, Гравин, Н & Игнатьев, АА 2025, Integrality Gap of Nash Welfare Maximization with Money. in ECAI 2025. 28th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Болонья, Italy, 25/10/25. https://doi.org/10.3233/faia251380

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Author

Дементьев, Юрий Ильич ; Гравин, Николай ; Игнатьев, Артур Андреевич. / Integrality Gap of Nash Welfare Maximization with Money. ECAI 2025. 2025.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{680a182fc62b4d0a91c19dfadea1d61e,
title = "Integrality Gap of Nash Welfare Maximization with Money",
abstract = "The Nash Welfare (NW) objective—the geometric mean of utilities—is often considered as a good compromise between fairness and efficiency. The respective maximization problem (MNW) for indivisible goods was first proposed in [11] and has received significant attention in the recent years with the current best e1/eapproximation guarantee. A natural approach of first solving fractional MNW (i.e., where all items are divisible) and then rounding solution does not work, as the integrality gap of MNW can be unbounded [11]. However, from a practical perspective, e.g., in inheritance division, many instances are actually mixed. I.e., the instance has a significant amount of liquid assets, which can be easily converted into money and thus divided fractionally between agents. Wemodel such instances with a set of indivisible goods and a single divisible good—money, which has the same value for every agent. We study the integrality gap of the MNW parametrized by the amount of money s in the instance. This parametrization is closely related to the literature on fair division with subsidies initiated by [17], where it is assumed that the maximum value of any agent per item is vmax = 1. We find that the IG may be non-monotone in s and could be strictly larger than 1 for a large amount of money s = O(n · m) dollars.On the positive side, we construct a polynomial scheme that with theamount of money c · n produces an integral allocation with integrality gap IG(s) ≤ maxα∈[0,1]( 2c2c−1+α )α, where IG(s) < 1.43 for c = 0.51, IG(s) < 1.16 for c = 1, and IG(s) < 1.07 for c = 2.",
author = "Дементьев, {Юрий Ильич} and Николай Гравин and Игнатьев, {Артур Андреевич}",
year = "2025",
month = oct,
day = "21",
doi = "10.3233/faia251380",
language = "English",
booktitle = "ECAI 2025",
note = "28th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2025 ; Conference date: 25-10-2025 Through 30-10-2025",
url = "https://ecai2025.org/",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Integrality Gap of Nash Welfare Maximization with Money

AU - Дементьев, Юрий Ильич

AU - Гравин, Николай

AU - Игнатьев, Артур Андреевич

PY - 2025/10/21

Y1 - 2025/10/21

N2 - The Nash Welfare (NW) objective—the geometric mean of utilities—is often considered as a good compromise between fairness and efficiency. The respective maximization problem (MNW) for indivisible goods was first proposed in [11] and has received significant attention in the recent years with the current best e1/eapproximation guarantee. A natural approach of first solving fractional MNW (i.e., where all items are divisible) and then rounding solution does not work, as the integrality gap of MNW can be unbounded [11]. However, from a practical perspective, e.g., in inheritance division, many instances are actually mixed. I.e., the instance has a significant amount of liquid assets, which can be easily converted into money and thus divided fractionally between agents. Wemodel such instances with a set of indivisible goods and a single divisible good—money, which has the same value for every agent. We study the integrality gap of the MNW parametrized by the amount of money s in the instance. This parametrization is closely related to the literature on fair division with subsidies initiated by [17], where it is assumed that the maximum value of any agent per item is vmax = 1. We find that the IG may be non-monotone in s and could be strictly larger than 1 for a large amount of money s = O(n · m) dollars.On the positive side, we construct a polynomial scheme that with theamount of money c · n produces an integral allocation with integrality gap IG(s) ≤ maxα∈[0,1]( 2c2c−1+α )α, where IG(s) < 1.43 for c = 0.51, IG(s) < 1.16 for c = 1, and IG(s) < 1.07 for c = 2.

AB - The Nash Welfare (NW) objective—the geometric mean of utilities—is often considered as a good compromise between fairness and efficiency. The respective maximization problem (MNW) for indivisible goods was first proposed in [11] and has received significant attention in the recent years with the current best e1/eapproximation guarantee. A natural approach of first solving fractional MNW (i.e., where all items are divisible) and then rounding solution does not work, as the integrality gap of MNW can be unbounded [11]. However, from a practical perspective, e.g., in inheritance division, many instances are actually mixed. I.e., the instance has a significant amount of liquid assets, which can be easily converted into money and thus divided fractionally between agents. Wemodel such instances with a set of indivisible goods and a single divisible good—money, which has the same value for every agent. We study the integrality gap of the MNW parametrized by the amount of money s in the instance. This parametrization is closely related to the literature on fair division with subsidies initiated by [17], where it is assumed that the maximum value of any agent per item is vmax = 1. We find that the IG may be non-monotone in s and could be strictly larger than 1 for a large amount of money s = O(n · m) dollars.On the positive side, we construct a polynomial scheme that with theamount of money c · n produces an integral allocation with integrality gap IG(s) ≤ maxα∈[0,1]( 2c2c−1+α )α, where IG(s) < 1.43 for c = 0.51, IG(s) < 1.16 for c = 1, and IG(s) < 1.07 for c = 2.

U2 - 10.3233/faia251380

DO - 10.3233/faia251380

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - ECAI 2025

T2 - 28th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Y2 - 25 October 2025 through 30 October 2025

ER -

ID: 144591012