Influence in social networks with stubborn agents: From competition to bargaining

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Influence in social networks with stubborn agents: From competition to bargaining. / Kareeva, Yulia ; Sedakov, Artem ; Zhen, Mengke .

In: Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 444, 127790, 05.2023.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{e67d277e4f824e91b472c10bb618dc69,

title = "Influence in social networks with stubborn agents: From competition to bargaining",

abstract = "The literature on game-theoretic models of opinion dynamics in social networks mainly focuses on the Nash equilibrium, which reflects a competitive situation between influencing agents called players. In some real-world situations, however, players negotiate over a game; thus, a different type of solution needs to be considered to account for possible outcomes. In this paper, we examine an opinion dynamics game based on the Friedkin–Johnsen model for which we characterize the Pareto frontier, including the Nash bargaining solution. Next, we analyze this solution when there are changes in the susceptibility of noninfluencing agents with respect to their initial opinions. We also quantify how the Nash equilibrium outcome differs from the outcome prescribed by the Nash bargaining solution.",

keywords = "social networks, opinion dynamics, Friedkin–Johnsen model, discrete-time games, equilibrium, Bargaining, Discrete-time games, Social networks, Equilibrium, Opinion dynamics",

author = "Yulia Kareeva and Artem Sedakov and Mengke Zhen",

year = "2023",

month = may,

doi = "10.1016/j.amc.2022.127790",

language = "English",

volume = "444",

journal = "Applied Mathematics and Computation",

issn = "0096-3003",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Influence in social networks with stubborn agents: From competition to bargaining

AU - Kareeva, Yulia

AU - Sedakov, Artem

AU - Zhen, Mengke

PY - 2023/5

Y1 - 2023/5

N2 - The literature on game-theoretic models of opinion dynamics in social networks mainly focuses on the Nash equilibrium, which reflects a competitive situation between influencing agents called players. In some real-world situations, however, players negotiate over a game; thus, a different type of solution needs to be considered to account for possible outcomes. In this paper, we examine an opinion dynamics game based on the Friedkin–Johnsen model for which we characterize the Pareto frontier, including the Nash bargaining solution. Next, we analyze this solution when there are changes in the susceptibility of noninfluencing agents with respect to their initial opinions. We also quantify how the Nash equilibrium outcome differs from the outcome prescribed by the Nash bargaining solution.

AB - The literature on game-theoretic models of opinion dynamics in social networks mainly focuses on the Nash equilibrium, which reflects a competitive situation between influencing agents called players. In some real-world situations, however, players negotiate over a game; thus, a different type of solution needs to be considered to account for possible outcomes. In this paper, we examine an opinion dynamics game based on the Friedkin–Johnsen model for which we characterize the Pareto frontier, including the Nash bargaining solution. Next, we analyze this solution when there are changes in the susceptibility of noninfluencing agents with respect to their initial opinions. We also quantify how the Nash equilibrium outcome differs from the outcome prescribed by the Nash bargaining solution.

KW - social networks

KW - opinion dynamics

KW - Friedkin–Johnsen model

KW - discrete-time games

KW - equilibrium

KW - Bargaining

KW - Discrete-time games

KW - Social networks

KW - Equilibrium

KW - Opinion dynamics

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/67140c7a-0941-31d9-a90c-3733bca5ba78/

U2 - 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127790

DO - 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127790

M3 - Article

VL - 444

JO - Applied Mathematics and Computation

JF - Applied Mathematics and Computation

SN - 0096-3003

M1 - 127790

ER -

ID: 101579915