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Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem. / Mazalov, V. V.; Rettieva, A. N.

In: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2010, p. 598-606.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Mazalov, VV & Rettieva, AN 2010, 'Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem', Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 598-606. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230710040106

APA

Mazalov, V. V., & Rettieva, A. N. (2010). Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International, 49(4), 598-606. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230710040106

Vancouver

Mazalov VV, Rettieva AN. Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem. Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International. 2010;49(4):598-606. https://doi.org/10.1134/S1064230710040106

Author

Mazalov, V. V. ; Rettieva, A. N. / Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem. In: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International. 2010 ; Vol. 49, No. 4. pp. 598-606.

BibTeX

@article{87ef85896d2b45afb2d48b1ad9edbbbe,
title = "Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem",
abstract = "A dynamic game model of bioresource management problem is considered. The center (referee) which shares a reservoir, and the players (countries) which harvest the fish stock on their territory are the participants of this game. In this paper we investigate the new type of equilibrium—cooperative incentive equilibrium. The equilibria are constructed in the case, when the players punish each other for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium, and in the case, when the center punishes them for a deviation. Some results of the numerical modelling are given.",
author = "Mazalov, {V. V.} and Rettieva, {A. N.}",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1134/S1064230710040106",
language = "English",
volume = "49",
pages = "598--606",
journal = "Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International",
issn = "1064-2307",
publisher = "МАИК {"}Наука/Интерпериодика{"}",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incentive equilibrium in bioresource sharing problem

AU - Mazalov, V. V.

AU - Rettieva, A. N.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - A dynamic game model of bioresource management problem is considered. The center (referee) which shares a reservoir, and the players (countries) which harvest the fish stock on their territory are the participants of this game. In this paper we investigate the new type of equilibrium—cooperative incentive equilibrium. The equilibria are constructed in the case, when the players punish each other for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium, and in the case, when the center punishes them for a deviation. Some results of the numerical modelling are given.

AB - A dynamic game model of bioresource management problem is considered. The center (referee) which shares a reservoir, and the players (countries) which harvest the fish stock on their territory are the participants of this game. In this paper we investigate the new type of equilibrium—cooperative incentive equilibrium. The equilibria are constructed in the case, when the players punish each other for a deviation from the cooperative equilibrium, and in the case, when the center punishes them for a deviation. Some results of the numerical modelling are given.

U2 - 10.1134/S1064230710040106

DO - 10.1134/S1064230710040106

M3 - Article

VL - 49

SP - 598

EP - 606

JO - Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International

JF - Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International

SN - 1064-2307

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 134721428