In this paper, we propose a new equilibrium concept, hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium (HAN equilibrium), which captures the heterogeneity of a set of players in terms of their relations to other players. We assume that the set of players is partitioned into two subsets: individually rational and altruistic players. An individually rational player maximizes her own payoff and an altruistic player behaves individually supporting other players, thus maximizing other players’ payoffs. We characterize the set of hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibria relative to a given partition of players. Existence conditions are provided. Additionally, we discuss the connection of the hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium with other equilibrium concepts and provide several examples to support theoretical results.
Original languageEnglish
Article number5
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume54
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jun 2025

    Research areas

  • Existence theorem, Heterogeneous players, Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium, Unilateral support equilibrium

ID: 133466490