Hinges, deep disagreement and fixed points in the argumentation logic

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Hinges, deep disagreement and fixed points in the argumentation logic. / Lisanyuk, Elena .

In: Логико-философские штудии, Vol. 19, No. 1, 15.09.2021, p. 112–116.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Author

Lisanyuk, Elena . / Hinges, deep disagreement and fixed points in the argumentation logic. In: Логико-философские штудии. 2021 ; Vol. 19, No. 1. pp. 112–116.

BibTeX

@article{45827416b7c64031ad5f40499a345bc8,

title = "Hinges, deep disagreement and fixed points in the argumentation logic",

abstract = "In his treatise {\textquoteleft}On Certainty{\textquoteright} (1969) L. Wittgenstein compared the propositions expressing basic principles to the hinges enabling both doubting and justifying knowledge. In 1985 Robert Fogelin proposed the conception of deep disagreement in argumentation analysis and in his description of it he referred to the hinges. We continue Wittgenstein{\textquoteright}s hinges metaphor and compare pulling and pushing the door of knowledge to adopting contrary standings about principal issues, which can result in the deep disagreements. We suggest looking at the hinges enabling those door moves as at the fixed points in the extension semantic of the argumentation logic. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed points allows viewing rejected arguments as isolated deadlocks of the deep disagreements, or anti-extensions, and opens a possibility for a compromise on the basis of certain extensions.",

keywords = "argument, abstract argumentation framework, extension semantic, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Robert Fogelin",

author = "Elena Lisanyuk",

note = "Lisanyuk E. Hinges, Deep Disagreement and Fixed Points in the Argumentation Logic // Логико-философские штудии. 2021. Т. 19, № 1. С. 112–116. DOi: 10.52119/LPHS.2021.92.34. 008. ",

year = "2021",

month = sep,

day = "15",

doi = "10.52119/LPHS.2021.92.34.008",

language = "English",

volume = "19",

pages = "112–116",

journal = "Логико-философские штудии",

issn = "2071-9183",

publisher = "Санкт-Петербургское философское общество",

number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Hinges, deep disagreement and fixed points in the argumentation logic

AU - Lisanyuk, Elena

N1 - Lisanyuk E. Hinges, Deep Disagreement and Fixed Points in the Argumentation Logic // Логико-философские штудии. 2021. Т. 19, № 1. С. 112–116. DOi: 10.52119/LPHS.2021.92.34. 008.

PY - 2021/9/15

Y1 - 2021/9/15

N2 - In his treatise ‘On Certainty’ (1969) L. Wittgenstein compared the propositions expressing basic principles to the hinges enabling both doubting and justifying knowledge. In 1985 Robert Fogelin proposed the conception of deep disagreement in argumentation analysis and in his description of it he referred to the hinges. We continue Wittgenstein’s hinges metaphor and compare pulling and pushing the door of knowledge to adopting contrary standings about principal issues, which can result in the deep disagreements. We suggest looking at the hinges enabling those door moves as at the fixed points in the extension semantic of the argumentation logic. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed points allows viewing rejected arguments as isolated deadlocks of the deep disagreements, or anti-extensions, and opens a possibility for a compromise on the basis of certain extensions.

AB - In his treatise ‘On Certainty’ (1969) L. Wittgenstein compared the propositions expressing basic principles to the hinges enabling both doubting and justifying knowledge. In 1985 Robert Fogelin proposed the conception of deep disagreement in argumentation analysis and in his description of it he referred to the hinges. We continue Wittgenstein’s hinges metaphor and compare pulling and pushing the door of knowledge to adopting contrary standings about principal issues, which can result in the deep disagreements. We suggest looking at the hinges enabling those door moves as at the fixed points in the extension semantic of the argumentation logic. Interpreting the hinges as the fixed points allows viewing rejected arguments as isolated deadlocks of the deep disagreements, or anti-extensions, and opens a possibility for a compromise on the basis of certain extensions.

KW - argument

KW - abstract argumentation framework

KW - extension semantic

KW - Ludwig Wittgenstein

KW - Robert Fogelin

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/fa783653-4866-3f66-b128-f43033404ec7/

U2 - 10.52119/LPHS.2021.92.34.008

DO - 10.52119/LPHS.2021.92.34.008

M3 - Article

VL - 19

SP - 112

EP - 116

JO - Логико-философские штудии

JF - Логико-философские штудии

SN - 2071-9183

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 89651826