Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Fair-value accounting, asset sales and banks’ lending : The role of asset sales in reducing fair value’s pro-cyclical effects. / Downing, Jeff.
In: Studies in Economics and Finance, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2018, p. 163-177.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Fair-value accounting, asset sales and banks’ lending
T2 - The role of asset sales in reducing fair value’s pro-cyclical effects
AU - Downing, Jeff
N1 - Downing, J. Fair-value accounting, asset sales and banks’ lending: The role of asset sales in reducing fair value’s pro-cyclical effects / J. Downing // Studies in Economics and Finance. - 2018. - Volume 35, Issue 1. - P. 163-177. Publisher Copyright: © 2018, Emerald Publishing Limited.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Purpose: This paper aims to examine the interaction between fair-value accounting, asset sales and banks’ lending in booms and busts. Throughout, the author uses “fair value” and “mark-to-market” interchangeably, to denote an accounting regime where changes in the prices of banks’ assets affect regulatory capital. “Historic-cost accounting” has been used in the paper to denote an accounting regime where changes in asset prices do not affect regulatory capital. Design/methodology/approach: The author built a model that examines how the accounting regime affects banks’ incentives to sell assets and how the impact of the accounting regime on asset sales affects lending. Findings: In a bust, fair value strengthens banks’ incentives to sell assets. The resulting increase in sales increases banks’ lending capacity. Consequently, lending can be higher under fair value. Conversely, in a boom, historic cost strengthens banks incentives to sell assets. The resulting increase in sales increases banks’ lending capacity. Hence, lending can be higher under historic cost. Originality/value: This paper identifies a new channel through which the accounting regime could affect lending. The accounting regime can affect banks’ incentives to sell assets. The resulting difference in sales can affect banks’ ability to make new loans. Hence, in a boom, although banks book mark-to-market gains under fair value, asset sales could be higher under historic cost. Lending, thus, could be higher under historic cost. Conversely, in a bust, although banks book mark-to-market losses under fair value, sales could be higher under fair value. Lending, thus, could be higher under fair value.
AB - Purpose: This paper aims to examine the interaction between fair-value accounting, asset sales and banks’ lending in booms and busts. Throughout, the author uses “fair value” and “mark-to-market” interchangeably, to denote an accounting regime where changes in the prices of banks’ assets affect regulatory capital. “Historic-cost accounting” has been used in the paper to denote an accounting regime where changes in asset prices do not affect regulatory capital. Design/methodology/approach: The author built a model that examines how the accounting regime affects banks’ incentives to sell assets and how the impact of the accounting regime on asset sales affects lending. Findings: In a bust, fair value strengthens banks’ incentives to sell assets. The resulting increase in sales increases banks’ lending capacity. Consequently, lending can be higher under fair value. Conversely, in a boom, historic cost strengthens banks incentives to sell assets. The resulting increase in sales increases banks’ lending capacity. Hence, lending can be higher under historic cost. Originality/value: This paper identifies a new channel through which the accounting regime could affect lending. The accounting regime can affect banks’ incentives to sell assets. The resulting difference in sales can affect banks’ ability to make new loans. Hence, in a boom, although banks book mark-to-market gains under fair value, asset sales could be higher under historic cost. Lending, thus, could be higher under historic cost. Conversely, in a bust, although banks book mark-to-market losses under fair value, sales could be higher under fair value. Lending, thus, could be higher under fair value.
KW - Banking regulation
KW - Banks
KW - Fair-value accounting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044822848&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1108/SEF-10-2017-0294
DO - 10.1108/SEF-10-2017-0294
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044822848
VL - 35
SP - 163
EP - 177
JO - Studies in Economics and Finance
JF - Studies in Economics and Finance
SN - 1086-7376
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 100577065