Standard

Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem : International Game Theory Review. / Mazalov, V. V.; Melnik, A. V.

In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 18, No. 01, 2016.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Mazalov, VV & Melnik, AV 2016, 'Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem: International Game Theory Review', International Game Theory Review, vol. 18, no. 01. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198916500018

APA

Mazalov, V. V., & Melnik, A. V. (2016). Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem: International Game Theory Review. International Game Theory Review, 18(01). https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198916500018

Vancouver

Mazalov VV, Melnik AV. Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem: International Game Theory Review. International Game Theory Review. 2016;18(01). https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198916500018

Author

Mazalov, V. V. ; Melnik, A. V. / Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem : International Game Theory Review. In: International Game Theory Review. 2016 ; Vol. 18, No. 01.

BibTeX

@article{9d178956e9464dacb4e877290deb4fe7,
title = "Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem: International Game Theory Review",
abstract = "This paper considers a noncooperative transport game of n players on a communication graph. Here players are passenger transportation companies (carriers). Service requests form a Poisson process with an intensity rate matrix ?. Players announce prices for their services and passengers choose an appropriate service by minimizing their individual costs (the ticket price and the expected service time). For each carrier, we solve the pricing problem and define the equilibrium intensity flows in the conditions of competition. A special emphasis is placed on polynomial latency functions.",
author = "Mazalov, {V. V.} and Melnik, {A. V.}",
note = "doi: 10.1142/S0219198916500018",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1142/S0219198916500018",
language = "русский",
volume = "18",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
number = "01",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem

T2 - International Game Theory Review

AU - Mazalov, V. V.

AU - Melnik, A. V.

N1 - doi: 10.1142/S0219198916500018

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - This paper considers a noncooperative transport game of n players on a communication graph. Here players are passenger transportation companies (carriers). Service requests form a Poisson process with an intensity rate matrix ?. Players announce prices for their services and passengers choose an appropriate service by minimizing their individual costs (the ticket price and the expected service time). For each carrier, we solve the pricing problem and define the equilibrium intensity flows in the conditions of competition. A special emphasis is placed on polynomial latency functions.

AB - This paper considers a noncooperative transport game of n players on a communication graph. Here players are passenger transportation companies (carriers). Service requests form a Poisson process with an intensity rate matrix ?. Players announce prices for their services and passengers choose an appropriate service by minimizing their individual costs (the ticket price and the expected service time). For each carrier, we solve the pricing problem and define the equilibrium intensity flows in the conditions of competition. A special emphasis is placed on polynomial latency functions.

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198916500018

DO - 10.1142/S0219198916500018

M3 - статья

VL - 18

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 01

ER -

ID: 132705701