Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research
Equilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing. / Zakharov, V.; Krylatov, A.
Equilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing. Springer Nature, 2014. p. 641-648.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research
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TY - GEN
T1 - Equilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing
AU - Zakharov, V.
AU - Krylatov, A.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - The goal of the paper is to demonstrate possibilities of collaborative transportation network to minimize total travel time of the network users. Cooperative and competitive traffic flow assignment systems in case of m ≥ 2 navigation providers (Navigators) are compared. Each Navigator provides travel guidance for its customers (users) on the non-general topology network of parallel links. In both cases the main goals of Navigators are to minimize travel time of their users but the behavioral strategies are different. In competitive case the behavioral strategy of each Navigator is to minimize travel time of traffic flow of its navigation service users while in cooperative case – to minimize travel time of overall traffic flow. Competitive routing is formalized mathematically as a non-zero sum game and cooperative routing is formulated as an optimization problem. It is demonstrated that Nash equilibrium in the navigation game appears to be not Pareto optimal. Eventually it is shown that cooperative routing sys
AB - The goal of the paper is to demonstrate possibilities of collaborative transportation network to minimize total travel time of the network users. Cooperative and competitive traffic flow assignment systems in case of m ≥ 2 navigation providers (Navigators) are compared. Each Navigator provides travel guidance for its customers (users) on the non-general topology network of parallel links. In both cases the main goals of Navigators are to minimize travel time of their users but the behavioral strategies are different. In competitive case the behavioral strategy of each Navigator is to minimize travel time of traffic flow of its navigation service users while in cooperative case – to minimize travel time of overall traffic flow. Competitive routing is formalized mathematically as a non-zero sum game and cooperative routing is formulated as an optimization problem. It is demonstrated that Nash equilibrium in the navigation game appears to be not Pareto optimal. Eventually it is shown that cooperative routing sys
KW - competitive routing
KW - cooperative routing
KW - traffic flow assignment
KW - Wardrop equilibrium
KW - Nash equilibrium
KW - Pareto optimality
M3 - Conference contribution
SP - 641
EP - 648
BT - Equilibrium Assignments in Competitive and Cooperative Traffic Flow Routing
PB - Springer Nature
ER -
ID: 7018338