TY - GEN

T1 - Envy Stable Solutions for Allocation Problems with Public Resourses

AU - Naumova, Natalia I.

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - We consider problems of "fair" distribution of several different public resourses. If tau is a partition of a finite set N, each resourse c(j) is distributed between points of B-j is an element of tau. We suppose that either all resourses are goods or all resourses are bads. There are finite projects, each project use points from its subset of N (its coalition). A is the set of such coalitions. The gain/loss function of a project at an allocation depends only on the restriction of the allocation on the coalition of the project. The following 4 solutions are considered: the lexicographically maxmin solution, the lexicographically minmax solution, a generalization of Wardrop solution. For fixed collection of gain/loss functions, we define envy stable allocations with respect to Gamma, where the projects compare their gains/losses at fixed allocation if their coalitions are adjacent in Gamma. We describe conditions on A, tau, and Gamma that ensure the existence of envy stable solutions, and conditions that ensure the enclusion of the first three solutions in envy stable solution.

AB - We consider problems of "fair" distribution of several different public resourses. If tau is a partition of a finite set N, each resourse c(j) is distributed between points of B-j is an element of tau. We suppose that either all resourses are goods or all resourses are bads. There are finite projects, each project use points from its subset of N (its coalition). A is the set of such coalitions. The gain/loss function of a project at an allocation depends only on the restriction of the allocation on the coalition of the project. The following 4 solutions are considered: the lexicographically maxmin solution, the lexicographically minmax solution, a generalization of Wardrop solution. For fixed collection of gain/loss functions, we define envy stable allocations with respect to Gamma, where the projects compare their gains/losses at fixed allocation if their coalitions are adjacent in Gamma. We describe conditions on A, tau, and Gamma that ensure the existence of envy stable solutions, and conditions that ensure the enclusion of the first three solutions in envy stable solution.

KW - lexicographically maxmin solution

KW - Wardrop equilibrium

KW - envy stable solution

KW - equal sacrifice solution

M3 - статья в сборнике материалов конференции

SN - *****************

T3 - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SP - 261

EP - 272

BT - CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL XII

A2 - Petrosyan, LA

A2 - Zenkevich, NA

PB - Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета

Y2 - 27 June 2018 through 29 June 2018

ER -