Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review
Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. / Petrosyan, Leon A.; Yeung, David W.K.
Frontiers of Dynamic Games: Game Theory and Management, St. Petersburg, 2018. ed. / Leon A. Petrosyan; Vladimir V. Mazalov; Nikolay A. Zenkevich. Cham : Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. p. 209-230 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs
AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.
AU - Yeung, David W.K.
N1 - Petrosyan L.A., Yeung D.W.K. (2019) Dynamically Consistent Bi-level Cooperation of a Dynamic Game with Coalitional Blocs. In: Petrosyan L., Mazalov V., Zenkevich N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In many real-life scenarios, groups or nations with common interest form coalition blocs by agreement for mutual support and joint actions. This paper considers two levels of cooperation: cooperation among members within a coalition bloc and cooperation between the coalition blocs. Coalition blocs are formed by players with common interests to enhance their gains through cooperation. To increase their gains coalition blocs would negotiate to form a grand coalition. A grand coalition cooperation of the coalitional blocs is studied. The gains of each coalition are defined as components of the Shapley value. Dynamically consistent payoff distributions between coalitions and among players are derived for this double-level cooperation scheme. For definition of players’ gains inside each coalition the proportional solution is used.
AB - In many real-life scenarios, groups or nations with common interest form coalition blocs by agreement for mutual support and joint actions. This paper considers two levels of cooperation: cooperation among members within a coalition bloc and cooperation between the coalition blocs. Coalition blocs are formed by players with common interests to enhance their gains through cooperation. To increase their gains coalition blocs would negotiate to form a grand coalition. A grand coalition cooperation of the coalitional blocs is studied. The gains of each coalition are defined as components of the Shapley value. Dynamically consistent payoff distributions between coalitions and among players are derived for this double-level cooperation scheme. For definition of players’ gains inside each coalition the proportional solution is used.
KW - Coalition
KW - Dynamically consistent solution
KW - Imputation distribution procedure
KW - Proportional solution
KW - Shapley value
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073214551&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_11
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85073214551
SN - 9783030236984
T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
SP - 209
EP - 230
BT - Frontiers of Dynamic Games
A2 - Petrosyan, Leon A.
A2 - Mazalov, Vladimir V.
A2 - Zenkevich, Nikolay A.
PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG
CY - Cham
ER -
ID: 48343690