The monograph presents the results of studies of various dynamic game-theoretic models of environmental and economic management with the possibility of regime shifts during the game evolution and in the presence of uncertainties of various types. In particular, models with seasonal (periodic) switchings of parameter values of the simulated dynamic systems are considered; models of natural resource extraction with random duration and possible changes in the structure of the probability distribution; dynamic models of non-renewable resource extraction with uncertainty regarding the initial resource stock; multistage and multi-criteria models for the extraction of renewable resources with the ability to switch modes from a cooperative to a non-cooperative scenario, as well as with uncertainty regarding the coefficients of the relative importance of different objectives used by the players. Using methods of optimal control theory, dynamic game theory, probability theory and multicriteria optimization theory, non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are constructed, their properties are studied and some implementation mechanisms are proposed.
The book is addressed to specialists in the field of dynamic game theory, optimal control, ecology and environmental economics.