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Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration. / Petrosyan, Leon; Yeung, David; Pankratova, Yaroslavna.

Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Springer Nature, 2021. p. 269-278 (Trends in Mathematics).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Petrosyan, L, Yeung, D & Pankratova, Y 2021, Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration. in Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Trends in Mathematics, Springer Nature, pp. 269-278. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_15

APA

Petrosyan, L., Yeung, D., & Pankratova, Y. (2021). Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration. In Frontiers of Dynamic Games (pp. 269-278). (Trends in Mathematics). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_15

Vancouver

Petrosyan L, Yeung D, Pankratova Y. Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration. In Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Springer Nature. 2021. p. 269-278. (Trends in Mathematics). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_15

Author

Petrosyan, Leon ; Yeung, David ; Pankratova, Yaroslavna. / Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration. Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Springer Nature, 2021. pp. 269-278 (Trends in Mathematics).

BibTeX

@inbook{2c15076371f04d9484305c2a6c7ca7b1,
title = "Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration",
abstract = "In the paper, infinite horizon differential games on networks are considered. The cooperative version of the game is proposed, and the special type of characteristic function is introduced. It is proved that the constructed cooperative game is convex. Using the properties of payoff functions and the constructed characteristic function, the Shapley Value is computed. It is also proved that in this special class of differential games the Shapley value is time-consistent. In non cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Stability (PoS).",
keywords = "Differential Network Games, Nash equilibrium, Price of Stability, The Shapley Value",
author = "Leon Petrosyan and David Yeung and Yaroslavna Pankratova",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_15",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-030-93615-0",
series = "Trends in Mathematics",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
pages = "269--278",
booktitle = "Frontiers of Dynamic Games",
address = "Germany",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Differential Network Games with Infinite Duration

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

AU - Yeung, David

AU - Pankratova, Yaroslavna

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - In the paper, infinite horizon differential games on networks are considered. The cooperative version of the game is proposed, and the special type of characteristic function is introduced. It is proved that the constructed cooperative game is convex. Using the properties of payoff functions and the constructed characteristic function, the Shapley Value is computed. It is also proved that in this special class of differential games the Shapley value is time-consistent. In non cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Stability (PoS).

AB - In the paper, infinite horizon differential games on networks are considered. The cooperative version of the game is proposed, and the special type of characteristic function is introduced. It is proved that the constructed cooperative game is convex. Using the properties of payoff functions and the constructed characteristic function, the Shapley Value is computed. It is also proved that in this special class of differential games the Shapley value is time-consistent. In non cooperative case as solution concept the Nash Equilibrium is considered. Moreover, a special subclass of Nash equilibrium, based on threat and punishment strategies, is derived. Additionally, we compute the Price of Stability (PoS).

KW - Differential Network Games

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Price of Stability

KW - The Shapley Value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126660509&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_15

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_15

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85126660509

SN - 978-3-030-93615-0

T3 - Trends in Mathematics

SP - 269

EP - 278

BT - Frontiers of Dynamic Games

PB - Springer Nature

ER -

ID: 94124706