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Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract. / Sloev, I.; Nastych, M.

2016. Paper presented at 2016 CBIM Academic Workshop, Bilbao.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper

Harvard

Sloev, I & Nastych, M 2016, 'Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract', Paper presented at 2016 CBIM Academic Workshop, Bilbao, 29/06/16 - 1/07/16. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2748286>

APA

Sloev, I., & Nastych, M. (2016). Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract. Paper presented at 2016 CBIM Academic Workshop, Bilbao. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2748286

Vancouver

Sloev I, Nastych M. Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract. 2016. Paper presented at 2016 CBIM Academic Workshop, Bilbao.

Author

Sloev, I. ; Nastych, M. / Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract. Paper presented at 2016 CBIM Academic Workshop, Bilbao.

BibTeX

@conference{62f923abc2224700a811866cdd114adf,
title = "Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract",
abstract = "We analyze an equilibrium choice of a product quality within a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a supplier. A quality of an intermediate good is private information of the supplier and determines the quality of a final product. The manufacturer holds all bargaining power and proposes a profit sharing contract to the supplier. We show that (i) such the contract may serve as the efficient mechanism of within-chain coordination in special cases and (ii) tougher market competition may lead to a higher profit of both supplier and manufacturer.",
keywords = "supply chain, hold-up, profit sharing, quality improvement, competition",
author = "I. Sloev and M. Nastych",
year = "2016",
language = "English",
note = "2016 CBIM Academic Workshop ; Conference date: 29-06-2016 Through 01-07-2016",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - Coordination within a Supply Chain with a Profit Sharing Contract

AU - Sloev, I.

AU - Nastych, M.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - We analyze an equilibrium choice of a product quality within a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a supplier. A quality of an intermediate good is private information of the supplier and determines the quality of a final product. The manufacturer holds all bargaining power and proposes a profit sharing contract to the supplier. We show that (i) such the contract may serve as the efficient mechanism of within-chain coordination in special cases and (ii) tougher market competition may lead to a higher profit of both supplier and manufacturer.

AB - We analyze an equilibrium choice of a product quality within a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a supplier. A quality of an intermediate good is private information of the supplier and determines the quality of a final product. The manufacturer holds all bargaining power and proposes a profit sharing contract to the supplier. We show that (i) such the contract may serve as the efficient mechanism of within-chain coordination in special cases and (ii) tougher market competition may lead to a higher profit of both supplier and manufacturer.

KW - supply chain

KW - hold-up

KW - profit sharing

KW - quality improvement

KW - competition

M3 - Paper

T2 - 2016 CBIM Academic Workshop

Y2 - 29 June 2016 through 1 July 2016

ER -

ID: 10246838