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Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology. / Зенкевич, Николай Анатольевич; Никольченко, Наталья Константиновна; Березинец, Ирина Владимировна; Иванова, Маргарита Владимировна.

In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. XV, 30.12.2022, p. 325-339.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Зенкевич, НА, Никольченко, НК, Березинец, ИВ & Иванова, МВ 2022, 'Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology', Contributions to Game Theory and Management, vol. XV, pp. 325-339. https://doi.org/10.2021639/11701/spbu31.2022.24

APA

Зенкевич, Н. А., Никольченко, Н. К., Березинец, И. В., & Иванова, М. В. (2022). Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, XV, 325-339. https://doi.org/10.2021639/11701/spbu31.2022.24

Vancouver

Зенкевич НА, Никольченко НК, Березинец ИВ, Иванова МВ. Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology. Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2022 Dec 30;XV:325-339. https://doi.org/10.2021639/11701/spbu31.2022.24

Author

Зенкевич, Николай Анатольевич ; Никольченко, Наталья Константиновна ; Березинец, Ирина Владимировна ; Иванова, Маргарита Владимировна. / Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2022 ; Vol. XV. pp. 325-339.

BibTeX

@article{6ac4887a8c8142a8996a47f10d158371,
title = "Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology",
abstract = "The paper investigates the problem of supply chain coordination in supply networks using the revenue-sharing contract. The supply network has a combined topology and consist of three levels of hierarchy of participants: manufacturers, distributor, and retailers. The authors consider the companies {\textquoteright}performance improvement as the motivation of companies to operate in coordinating conditions. The contract procedure is modeled as a game between two companies. The game solution is a set of contract parameters, providing Nash equilibrium, achieving the maximum of the supply network profit and Pareto-optimality of the obtained solution. The results show the application of revenue-sharing contracts in such networks has several peculiarities: the role of a coordinator in the supply network should be performed by a distributor.",
keywords = "supply network, motivation, performance, coordination, revenue-sharing contract",
author = "Зенкевич, {Николай Анатольевич} and Никольченко, {Наталья Константиновна} and Березинец, {Ирина Владимировна} and Иванова, {Маргарита Владимировна}",
year = "2022",
month = dec,
day = "30",
doi = "10.2021639/11701/spbu31.2022.24",
language = "English",
volume = "XV",
pages = "325--339",
journal = "Contributions to Game Theory and Management",
issn = "2310-2608",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coordination in Supply Networks with Combined Topology

AU - Зенкевич, Николай Анатольевич

AU - Никольченко, Наталья Константиновна

AU - Березинец, Ирина Владимировна

AU - Иванова, Маргарита Владимировна

PY - 2022/12/30

Y1 - 2022/12/30

N2 - The paper investigates the problem of supply chain coordination in supply networks using the revenue-sharing contract. The supply network has a combined topology and consist of three levels of hierarchy of participants: manufacturers, distributor, and retailers. The authors consider the companies ’performance improvement as the motivation of companies to operate in coordinating conditions. The contract procedure is modeled as a game between two companies. The game solution is a set of contract parameters, providing Nash equilibrium, achieving the maximum of the supply network profit and Pareto-optimality of the obtained solution. The results show the application of revenue-sharing contracts in such networks has several peculiarities: the role of a coordinator in the supply network should be performed by a distributor.

AB - The paper investigates the problem of supply chain coordination in supply networks using the revenue-sharing contract. The supply network has a combined topology and consist of three levels of hierarchy of participants: manufacturers, distributor, and retailers. The authors consider the companies ’performance improvement as the motivation of companies to operate in coordinating conditions. The contract procedure is modeled as a game between two companies. The game solution is a set of contract parameters, providing Nash equilibrium, achieving the maximum of the supply network profit and Pareto-optimality of the obtained solution. The results show the application of revenue-sharing contracts in such networks has several peculiarities: the role of a coordinator in the supply network should be performed by a distributor.

KW - supply network, motivation, performance, coordination, revenue-sharing contract

U2 - 10.2021639/11701/spbu31.2022.24

DO - 10.2021639/11701/spbu31.2022.24

M3 - Article

VL - XV

SP - 325

EP - 339

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -

ID: 102037521