Cooperative strong equilibrium in vehicle routing game

Standard

Cooperative strong equilibrium in vehicle routing game. / Zenkevich, N. A.; Zyatchin, A. V.

In: Automation and Remote Control, Vol. 77, No. 10, 2016, p. 1867–1881.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{a541364ffefb44b5b1adcb6c91178eb8,

title = "Cooperative strong equilibrium in vehicle routing game",

abstract = "In this paper, a game-theoretic approach is considered for the vehicle routing problem with many distributors. Each customer is characterized by demand and wholesale price. Within such a statement, some customers are possibly not visited by a distributor in the optimal solution. This problem is called the vehicle routing game (VRG) in coordinated strategies. A procedure for determining a strong equilibrium in the VRG is proposed which is stable against coalitional deviations. According to the procedure, the optimization problem is solved iteratively for each distributor. The set of unvisited customers is reduced at each step. The existence of two classes of strong equilibria is proved. The concept of a cooperative strong equilibrium is presented. All results are illustrated by numerical examples.",

keywords = "SCOPUS",

author = "Zenkevich, {N. A.} and Zyatchin, {A. V.}",

note = "Zenkevich, N. A. Cooperative strong equilibrium in vehicle routing game / N. A. Zenkevich, A. V. Zyatchin // Automation and Remote Control. - 2016. - Volume 77, Issue 10. - P. 1867–1881",

year = "2016",

doi = "10.1134/S0005117916100131",

language = "English",

volume = "77",

pages = "1867–1881",

journal = "Automation and Remote Control",

issn = "0005-1179",

publisher = "МАИК {"}Наука/Интерпериодика{"}",

number = "10",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Cooperative strong equilibrium in vehicle routing game

AU - Zenkevich, N. A.

AU - Zyatchin, A. V.

N1 - Zenkevich, N. A. Cooperative strong equilibrium in vehicle routing game / N. A. Zenkevich, A. V. Zyatchin // Automation and Remote Control. - 2016. - Volume 77, Issue 10. - P. 1867–1881

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - In this paper, a game-theoretic approach is considered for the vehicle routing problem with many distributors. Each customer is characterized by demand and wholesale price. Within such a statement, some customers are possibly not visited by a distributor in the optimal solution. This problem is called the vehicle routing game (VRG) in coordinated strategies. A procedure for determining a strong equilibrium in the VRG is proposed which is stable against coalitional deviations. According to the procedure, the optimization problem is solved iteratively for each distributor. The set of unvisited customers is reduced at each step. The existence of two classes of strong equilibria is proved. The concept of a cooperative strong equilibrium is presented. All results are illustrated by numerical examples.

AB - In this paper, a game-theoretic approach is considered for the vehicle routing problem with many distributors. Each customer is characterized by demand and wholesale price. Within such a statement, some customers are possibly not visited by a distributor in the optimal solution. This problem is called the vehicle routing game (VRG) in coordinated strategies. A procedure for determining a strong equilibrium in the VRG is proposed which is stable against coalitional deviations. According to the procedure, the optimization problem is solved iteratively for each distributor. The set of unvisited customers is reduced at each step. The existence of two classes of strong equilibria is proved. The concept of a cooperative strong equilibrium is presented. All results are illustrated by numerical examples.

KW - SCOPUS

U2 - 10.1134/S0005117916100131

DO - 10.1134/S0005117916100131

M3 - Article

VL - 77

SP - 1867

EP - 1881

JO - Automation and Remote Control

JF - Automation and Remote Control

SN - 0005-1179

IS - 10

ER -

ID: 7607597