In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbook of Dynamic Game Theory
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages595-632
Number of pages38
ISBN (Electronic)9783319443744
ISBN (Print)9783319443737
DOIs
StatePublished - 12 Aug 2018

    Research areas

  • Cooperative differential games, Core, Imputation distribution procedure, Shapley value, Strong time consistency, Time consistency

    Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

ID: 48343182