Standard

Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information. / Petrosjan, L. A.

In: Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Ser 1. Matematika Mekhanika Astronomiya, No. 2, 01.12.1999, p. 49-55.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Petrosjan, LA 1999, 'Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information', Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Ser 1. Matematika Mekhanika Astronomiya, no. 2, pp. 49-55.

APA

Petrosjan, L. A. (1999). Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Ser 1. Matematika Mekhanika Astronomiya, (2), 49-55.

Vancouver

Petrosjan LA. Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information. Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Ser 1. Matematika Mekhanika Astronomiya. 1999 Dec 1;(2):49-55.

Author

Petrosjan, L. A. / Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information. In: Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Ser 1. Matematika Mekhanika Astronomiya. 1999 ; No. 2. pp. 49-55.

BibTeX

@article{9cab1edcaaa14fa99142d94bd2801331,
title = "Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information",
abstract = "A nonzerosum game with perfect information is considered. The new notion of player's {"}type{"} is introduced as a vector whose components define its relations to the other players. In the case of equivalent alternatives the decision is made with the help of the relations-vector. A pair consisting of a relations-vector and a strategy (in the usual sense) is called {"}type-strategy{"}. It is proved that in the case the relation-vectors are common knowledge for all players in the game there exists a unique in the sense of payoffs Nash equilibria. The examples show the dependence of Nash equilibria from player types.",
author = "Petrosjan, {L. A.}",
year = "1999",
month = dec,
day = "1",
language = "русский",
pages = "49--55",
journal = "ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. МАТЕМАТИКА. МЕХАНИКА. АСТРОНОМИЯ",
issn = "1025-3106",
publisher = "Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Construction of unique in the sense of payoffs nash equilibria in the game with perfect information

AU - Petrosjan, L. A.

PY - 1999/12/1

Y1 - 1999/12/1

N2 - A nonzerosum game with perfect information is considered. The new notion of player's "type" is introduced as a vector whose components define its relations to the other players. In the case of equivalent alternatives the decision is made with the help of the relations-vector. A pair consisting of a relations-vector and a strategy (in the usual sense) is called "type-strategy". It is proved that in the case the relation-vectors are common knowledge for all players in the game there exists a unique in the sense of payoffs Nash equilibria. The examples show the dependence of Nash equilibria from player types.

AB - A nonzerosum game with perfect information is considered. The new notion of player's "type" is introduced as a vector whose components define its relations to the other players. In the case of equivalent alternatives the decision is made with the help of the relations-vector. A pair consisting of a relations-vector and a strategy (in the usual sense) is called "type-strategy". It is proved that in the case the relation-vectors are common knowledge for all players in the game there exists a unique in the sense of payoffs Nash equilibria. The examples show the dependence of Nash equilibria from player types.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77949682120&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - статья

AN - SCOPUS:77949682120

SP - 49

EP - 55

JO - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. МАТЕМАТИКА. МЕХАНИКА. АСТРОНОМИЯ

JF - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. МАТЕМАТИКА. МЕХАНИКА. АСТРОНОМИЯ

SN - 1025-3106

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 36953174