TY - JOUR

T1 - Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Why the Hard Problem Doesn't Need a Solution

AU - Sekatskaya, Maria

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - The hard problem of consciousness is to explain how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. I am arguing that the hard problem is not a problem for science. As soon as the nomological correlation between subjective experience and objective facts about the brain is established, the scientific understanding of consciousness is in place. What we need in order to solve the remaining hard problem is not a discovery of new facts about the brain and not a formulation of psychophysical bridging principles, but the realization that the concepts we use in our discussion about consciousness must be changed, because they make the hard problem unsolvable.

AB - The hard problem of consciousness is to explain how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. I am arguing that the hard problem is not a problem for science. As soon as the nomological correlation between subjective experience and objective facts about the brain is established, the scientific understanding of consciousness is in place. What we need in order to solve the remaining hard problem is not a discovery of new facts about the brain and not a formulation of psychophysical bridging principles, but the realization that the concepts we use in our discussion about consciousness must be changed, because they make the hard problem unsolvable.

M3 - статья

JO - ВОПРОСЫ ФИЛОСОФИИ

JF - ВОПРОСЫ ФИЛОСОФИИ

SN - 0042-8744

IS - 4

ER -