TY - JOUR

T1 - Conditions for sustainable cooperation

AU - Petrosjan, L.A.

AU - Zenkevich, N.A.

N1 - Petrosjan, L.A. Conditions for sustainable cooperation / L. A. Petrojan, N. A. Zenkevich // Automation and Remote Control. - 2015. -Vol. 76, №10. - P. 1894-1904.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - There are three important aspects to-be-taken into account when the stability problem of a long-term cooperative agreement is investigated: time consistency (dynamic stability) of the cooperative agreement, strategic stability and irrational behavior proofness. The mathematical results based on imputation distribution procedure (IDP) are developed for dealing with the above-mentioned aspects of cooperation. The authors prove that, for a special class of differential games, a time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by a Nash equilibrium. An example is also considered, where all the three conditions are satisfied.

AB - There are three important aspects to-be-taken into account when the stability problem of a long-term cooperative agreement is investigated: time consistency (dynamic stability) of the cooperative agreement, strategic stability and irrational behavior proofness. The mathematical results based on imputation distribution procedure (IDP) are developed for dealing with the above-mentioned aspects of cooperation. The authors prove that, for a special class of differential games, a time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by a Nash equilibrium. An example is also considered, where all the three conditions are satisfied.

KW - РИНЦ

KW - SCOPUS

U2 - 10.1134/S0005117915100148

DO - 10.1134/S0005117915100148

M3 - Article

VL - 76

SP - 1894

EP - 1904

JO - Automation and Remote Control

JF - Automation and Remote Control

SN - 0005-1179

IS - 10

ER -