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Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks. / Krylatov, Alexander Y.; Zakharov, Victor V.; Malygin, Igor G.

In: Transport and Telecommunication, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2016, p. 212-221.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Krylatov, AY, Zakharov, VV & Malygin, IG 2016, 'Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks', Transport and Telecommunication, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 212-221. https://doi.org/10.1515/ttj-2016-0019

APA

Krylatov, A. Y., Zakharov, V. V., & Malygin, I. G. (2016). Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks. Transport and Telecommunication, 17(3), 212-221. https://doi.org/10.1515/ttj-2016-0019

Vancouver

Author

Krylatov, Alexander Y. ; Zakharov, Victor V. ; Malygin, Igor G. / Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks. In: Transport and Telecommunication. 2016 ; Vol. 17, No. 3. pp. 212-221.

BibTeX

@article{29aa4b6927624ea29fb71e29a97747cb,
title = "Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks",
abstract = "Recently in-vehicle route guidance and information systems are rapidly developing. Such systems are expected to reduce congestion in an urban traffic area. This social benefit is believed to be reached by imposing the route choices on the network users that lead to the system optimum traffic assignment. However, guidance service could be offered by different competitive business companies. Then route choices of different mutually independent groups of users may reject traffic assignment from the system optimum state. In this paper, a game theoretic approach is shown to be very efficient to formalize competitive traffic assignment problem with various groups of users in the form of non-cooperative network game with the Nash equilibrium search. The relationships between the Wardrop{\textquoteright}s system optimum associated with the traffic assignment problem and the Nash equilibrium associated with the competitive traffic assignment problem are investigated. Moreover, some related aspects of the Nash equilibrium and the Ward",
keywords = "competitive traffic assignment, Nash equilibrium, system optimum of Wardrop, user equilibrium of Wardrop",
author = "Krylatov, {Alexander Y.} and Zakharov, {Victor V.} and Malygin, {Igor G.}",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1515/ttj-2016-0019",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "212--221",
journal = "Transport and Telecommunication",
issn = "1407-6160",
publisher = "Transport and Telecommunication Institute",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competitive Traffic Assignment in Road Networks

AU - Krylatov, Alexander Y.

AU - Zakharov, Victor V.

AU - Malygin, Igor G.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Recently in-vehicle route guidance and information systems are rapidly developing. Such systems are expected to reduce congestion in an urban traffic area. This social benefit is believed to be reached by imposing the route choices on the network users that lead to the system optimum traffic assignment. However, guidance service could be offered by different competitive business companies. Then route choices of different mutually independent groups of users may reject traffic assignment from the system optimum state. In this paper, a game theoretic approach is shown to be very efficient to formalize competitive traffic assignment problem with various groups of users in the form of non-cooperative network game with the Nash equilibrium search. The relationships between the Wardrop’s system optimum associated with the traffic assignment problem and the Nash equilibrium associated with the competitive traffic assignment problem are investigated. Moreover, some related aspects of the Nash equilibrium and the Ward

AB - Recently in-vehicle route guidance and information systems are rapidly developing. Such systems are expected to reduce congestion in an urban traffic area. This social benefit is believed to be reached by imposing the route choices on the network users that lead to the system optimum traffic assignment. However, guidance service could be offered by different competitive business companies. Then route choices of different mutually independent groups of users may reject traffic assignment from the system optimum state. In this paper, a game theoretic approach is shown to be very efficient to formalize competitive traffic assignment problem with various groups of users in the form of non-cooperative network game with the Nash equilibrium search. The relationships between the Wardrop’s system optimum associated with the traffic assignment problem and the Nash equilibrium associated with the competitive traffic assignment problem are investigated. Moreover, some related aspects of the Nash equilibrium and the Ward

KW - competitive traffic assignment

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - system optimum of Wardrop

KW - user equilibrium of Wardrop

U2 - 10.1515/ttj-2016-0019

DO - 10.1515/ttj-2016-0019

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 212

EP - 221

JO - Transport and Telecommunication

JF - Transport and Telecommunication

SN - 1407-6160

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 7574927