Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of Cross-Generational Environmental Commons

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Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of Cross-Generational Environmental Commons. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

In: International Game Theory Review, 10.09.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{6ce0985f9c214b8a969da04f7565dd88,

title = "Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of Cross-Generational Environmental Commons",

abstract = "Different entry and exit times and overlapping generations of players are common in real-life game situations. In addition, durable strategies which have effects over a period of time are no less common than nondurable strategies which have only one-shot effects. This paper develops a new class of dynamic games which contains durable strategies with asynchronous players' horizons. The optimization techniques for solving asynchronous horizons durable strategies control are derived. Noncooperative game equilibria and cooperative optimal solution are presented. An asynchronous horizons durable strategies dynamic environmental game is provided to analyze the seemingly catastrophe-bound environmental degradation problem. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in cross-generational exploitation of environmental commons is calibrated. A cooperative solution with a dynamically stable compensatory scheme is presented to alleviate the problem.",

keywords = "asynchronous horizons, Durable strategies, dynamic games, environmental commons",

author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 World Scientific Publishing Company.",

year = "2021",

month = sep,

day = "10",

doi = "10.1142/s0219198921500201",

language = "English",

journal = "International Game Theory Review",

issn = "0219-1989",

publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games and Tragedy of Cross-Generational Environmental Commons

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

PY - 2021/9/10

Y1 - 2021/9/10

N2 - Different entry and exit times and overlapping generations of players are common in real-life game situations. In addition, durable strategies which have effects over a period of time are no less common than nondurable strategies which have only one-shot effects. This paper develops a new class of dynamic games which contains durable strategies with asynchronous players' horizons. The optimization techniques for solving asynchronous horizons durable strategies control are derived. Noncooperative game equilibria and cooperative optimal solution are presented. An asynchronous horizons durable strategies dynamic environmental game is provided to analyze the seemingly catastrophe-bound environmental degradation problem. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in cross-generational exploitation of environmental commons is calibrated. A cooperative solution with a dynamically stable compensatory scheme is presented to alleviate the problem.

AB - Different entry and exit times and overlapping generations of players are common in real-life game situations. In addition, durable strategies which have effects over a period of time are no less common than nondurable strategies which have only one-shot effects. This paper develops a new class of dynamic games which contains durable strategies with asynchronous players' horizons. The optimization techniques for solving asynchronous horizons durable strategies control are derived. Noncooperative game equilibria and cooperative optimal solution are presented. An asynchronous horizons durable strategies dynamic environmental game is provided to analyze the seemingly catastrophe-bound environmental degradation problem. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in cross-generational exploitation of environmental commons is calibrated. A cooperative solution with a dynamically stable compensatory scheme is presented to alleviate the problem.

KW - asynchronous horizons

KW - Durable strategies

KW - dynamic games

KW - environmental commons

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85116837811&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/8972c59a-b3d7-3172-a08d-68f867be7b69/

U2 - 10.1142/s0219198921500201

DO - 10.1142/s0219198921500201

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85116837811

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

ER -

ID: 87890542