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Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees. / Parilina, E.; Zaccour, G.

In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 43, No. 5, 2015, p. 507-513.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Parilina, E & Zaccour, G 2015, 'Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees', Operations Research Letters, vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 507-513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.07.006

APA

Parilina, E., & Zaccour, G. (2015). Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees. Operations Research Letters, 43(5), 507-513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.07.006

Vancouver

Parilina E, Zaccour G. Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees. Operations Research Letters. 2015;43(5):507-513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.07.006

Author

Parilina, E. ; Zaccour, G. / Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees. In: Operations Research Letters. 2015 ; Vol. 43, No. 5. pp. 507-513.

BibTeX

@article{751fd7e64fab4a76b2191e4fbd796b7a,
title = "Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees",
abstract = "We consider the class of stochastic games played over event trees. We suppose that the players agree to cooperate and maximize their joint payoff. To sustain cooperation over the event tree, we use trigger strategies. As we are dealing with a finite horizon, it is known that deviation from cooperation in the last stage cannot be deterred, as there is no possibility for punishing the deviator(s). Consequently, we focus on epsilon equilibria. We prove the existence of an epsilon-perfect equilibrium",
author = "E. Parilina and G. Zaccour",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2015.07.006",
language = "English",
volume = "43",
pages = "507--513",
journal = "Operations Research Letters",
issn = "0167-6377",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees

AU - Parilina, E.

AU - Zaccour, G.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We consider the class of stochastic games played over event trees. We suppose that the players agree to cooperate and maximize their joint payoff. To sustain cooperation over the event tree, we use trigger strategies. As we are dealing with a finite horizon, it is known that deviation from cooperation in the last stage cannot be deterred, as there is no possibility for punishing the deviator(s). Consequently, we focus on epsilon equilibria. We prove the existence of an epsilon-perfect equilibrium

AB - We consider the class of stochastic games played over event trees. We suppose that the players agree to cooperate and maximize their joint payoff. To sustain cooperation over the event tree, we use trigger strategies. As we are dealing with a finite horizon, it is known that deviation from cooperation in the last stage cannot be deterred, as there is no possibility for punishing the deviator(s). Consequently, we focus on epsilon equilibria. We prove the existence of an epsilon-perfect equilibrium

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2015.07.006

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2015.07.006

M3 - Article

VL - 43

SP - 507

EP - 513

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

SN - 0167-6377

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 3939545