TY - CHAP

T1 - Analysis of Economic Behaviour in Evolutionary Model of Tax Control Under Information Diffusion

AU - Kumacheva, Suriya

AU - Gubar, Elena

AU - Zhitkova, Ekaterina

AU - Tomilina, Galina

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020, The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Nowadays many economic fields are dependent on information flows. Information serves as a strategic tool in economics, business and many social processes. In particular, spreading information among taxpayers can be used as a control parameter in tax control. The probability of auditing which encourages tax payments used to be considered as a unique tool to stimulate tax collection. The current study represents a combined approach where tools of evolutionary game theory and network modeling are applied to the analysis of agents’ economic behavior. Information of possible tax auditing is disseminated across the population of taxpayers and is supposed to be a main factor influencing their decision on whether to evade or not. According to the previous research, interactions and dissemination of information or rumors among taxpayers in long-term period can be formulated as an evolutionary process. It is assumed that agents tend to spread information or rumors over their own contact network of neighbors and colleagues rather than over randomly chosen agents. Thus, the network model of social interaction is constructed. Information spreading in the network of various topology (e.g. grid, random network, etc.) is considered as an evolutionary process where agents’ behavior is described by the stochastic imitation dynamics and their interaction is described by different modifications of the bimatrix games which generate evolutionary dynamics. Scenario analysis is supported by the series of experiments. Numerous simulations help visualize the process of information spreading across different types of network, imitation protocols and players payoffs. The results show that information flow helps encourage tax payments in the population.

AB - Nowadays many economic fields are dependent on information flows. Information serves as a strategic tool in economics, business and many social processes. In particular, spreading information among taxpayers can be used as a control parameter in tax control. The probability of auditing which encourages tax payments used to be considered as a unique tool to stimulate tax collection. The current study represents a combined approach where tools of evolutionary game theory and network modeling are applied to the analysis of agents’ economic behavior. Information of possible tax auditing is disseminated across the population of taxpayers and is supposed to be a main factor influencing their decision on whether to evade or not. According to the previous research, interactions and dissemination of information or rumors among taxpayers in long-term period can be formulated as an evolutionary process. It is assumed that agents tend to spread information or rumors over their own contact network of neighbors and colleagues rather than over randomly chosen agents. Thus, the network model of social interaction is constructed. Information spreading in the network of various topology (e.g. grid, random network, etc.) is considered as an evolutionary process where agents’ behavior is described by the stochastic imitation dynamics and their interaction is described by different modifications of the bimatrix games which generate evolutionary dynamics. Scenario analysis is supported by the series of experiments. Numerous simulations help visualize the process of information spreading across different types of network, imitation protocols and players payoffs. The results show that information flow helps encourage tax payments in the population.

KW - Economic behavior

KW - Evolutionary games

KW - Information diffusion

KW - Network modeling

KW - Tax control

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85095135357&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/bfb5cd13-f56f-3950-b1e5-0cbf8a58c702/

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-51941-4_9

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-51941-4_9

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85095135357

T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 121

EP - 140

BT - Static and Dynamic Game Theory

PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG

ER -