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Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint. / Malygina, Anastasia; Fikenscher, Sven Eric; Nielsen, Jenny.

In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 4, 04.07.2017, p. 279-283.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Malygina, A, Fikenscher, SE & Nielsen, J 2017, 'Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 73, no. 4, pp. 279-283. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049

APA

Malygina, A., Fikenscher, S. E., & Nielsen, J. (2017). Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73(4), 279-283. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049

Vancouver

Malygina A, Fikenscher SE, Nielsen J. Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2017 Jul 4;73(4):279-283. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049

Author

Malygina, Anastasia ; Fikenscher, Sven Eric ; Nielsen, Jenny. / Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint. In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2017 ; Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 279-283.

BibTeX

@article{950ed25928fa4337aa7091f1b710ec26,
title = "Amid high tensions, an urgent need for nuclear restraint",
abstract = "With tensions running high between the United States and Russia, North Korea conducting nuclear tests, and every nuclear-armed nation modernizing its arsenal, the world seems headed toward greater nuclear instability. Changing course will not be easy, and progress must begin with serious bilateral confidence-building, arms control, and disarmament efforts by Russia and the United States. But the two sides have expressed clearly divergent nuclear priorities in recent years, even as the danger of military escalation has increased. Meanwhile, the multilateral nonproliferation regime seems to be splitting into polarized camps, characterized by starkly differing views on the value, role, and risks of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, leaders can demonstrate prudence and restraint by working toward a universal no-first-use norm, conducting dialogue on de-alerting nuclear weapons, and developing effective verification procedures for decommissioning and destroying nuclear warheads. In the long run, the United States and Russia can still aim for a grand bargain on arsenal reductions. In the meantime, they and the other recognized nuclear weapon states can explore whether strategic stability can someday be maintained through means other than nuclear weapons–for example, through frameworks of cooperative alliances or weapons systems of the future.",
keywords = "Crimea, Denmark, humanitarian initiative, nuclear disarmament, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons, Russia, strategic stability, Syria, United States",
author = "Anastasia Malygina and Fikenscher, {Sven Eric} and Jenny Nielsen",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.",
year = "2017",
month = jul,
day = "4",
doi = "10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049",
language = "English",
volume = "73",
pages = "279--283",
journal = "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists",
issn = "0096-3402",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",
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AU - Malygina, Anastasia

AU - Fikenscher, Sven Eric

AU - Nielsen, Jenny

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2017 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

PY - 2017/7/4

Y1 - 2017/7/4

N2 - With tensions running high between the United States and Russia, North Korea conducting nuclear tests, and every nuclear-armed nation modernizing its arsenal, the world seems headed toward greater nuclear instability. Changing course will not be easy, and progress must begin with serious bilateral confidence-building, arms control, and disarmament efforts by Russia and the United States. But the two sides have expressed clearly divergent nuclear priorities in recent years, even as the danger of military escalation has increased. Meanwhile, the multilateral nonproliferation regime seems to be splitting into polarized camps, characterized by starkly differing views on the value, role, and risks of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, leaders can demonstrate prudence and restraint by working toward a universal no-first-use norm, conducting dialogue on de-alerting nuclear weapons, and developing effective verification procedures for decommissioning and destroying nuclear warheads. In the long run, the United States and Russia can still aim for a grand bargain on arsenal reductions. In the meantime, they and the other recognized nuclear weapon states can explore whether strategic stability can someday be maintained through means other than nuclear weapons–for example, through frameworks of cooperative alliances or weapons systems of the future.

AB - With tensions running high between the United States and Russia, North Korea conducting nuclear tests, and every nuclear-armed nation modernizing its arsenal, the world seems headed toward greater nuclear instability. Changing course will not be easy, and progress must begin with serious bilateral confidence-building, arms control, and disarmament efforts by Russia and the United States. But the two sides have expressed clearly divergent nuclear priorities in recent years, even as the danger of military escalation has increased. Meanwhile, the multilateral nonproliferation regime seems to be splitting into polarized camps, characterized by starkly differing views on the value, role, and risks of nuclear weapons. In such an environment, leaders can demonstrate prudence and restraint by working toward a universal no-first-use norm, conducting dialogue on de-alerting nuclear weapons, and developing effective verification procedures for decommissioning and destroying nuclear warheads. In the long run, the United States and Russia can still aim for a grand bargain on arsenal reductions. In the meantime, they and the other recognized nuclear weapon states can explore whether strategic stability can someday be maintained through means other than nuclear weapons–for example, through frameworks of cooperative alliances or weapons systems of the future.

KW - Crimea

KW - Denmark

KW - humanitarian initiative

KW - nuclear disarmament

KW - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

KW - nuclear weapons

KW - Russia

KW - strategic stability

KW - Syria

KW - United States

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U2 - 10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049

DO - 10.1080/00963402.2017.1338049

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JO - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

JF - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

SN - 0096-3402

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ID: 7751060