We consider a model of renewable resource extraction described by a differential game with infinite horizon. The environmental problems are often considered from cooperative prospective as selfish behavior of the players may negatively affects not only on other players’ profits, but also on the environment. The reason is the joint stock of resource which is influenced by all players. We characterize the Berge and altruistic equilibrium in a differential game of renewable resource extraction and compare them with the Nash equilibrium. According to the concept of altruistic equilibrium players can choose the part of the other players’ payoffs they support and summarize with the part of their own profit. This equilibrium can be considered as an intermediate between Berge and Nash equilibria. We make numerical simulations and demonstrate theoretical results for the case of n symmetric players.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 20th International Conference, MOTOR 2021, Proceedings
EditorsPanos Pardalos, Michael Khachay, Alexander Kazakov
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages326-339
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9783030778750
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021
Event20th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research , MOTOR 2021 - Virtual, Online, Russian Federation
Duration: 5 Jul 202110 Jul 2021
Conference number: 20
https://conference.icc.ru/event/3

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume12755 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference20th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research , MOTOR 2021
Abbreviated titleMOTOR 2021
Country/TerritoryRussian Federation
CityVirtual, Online
Period5/07/2110/07/21
Internet address

    Research areas

  • Altruistic equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, Dynamic games, Renewable resources

    Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

ID: 84476739