Standard

A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.

Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, 2019. p. 395-417.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2019, A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development. in Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, pp. 395-417.

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2019). A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development. In Game Theoretic Analysis (pp. 395-417). WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD.

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development. In Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD. 2019. p. 395-417

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. / A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development. Game Theoretic Analysis. WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD, 2019. pp. 395-417

BibTeX

@inbook{96db0444b9c44abeab5018f677245c55,
title = "A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development",
abstract = "Cooperative adoption and development of clean technology play a key role to effectively solving the continual worsening industrial pollution problem. For cooperation over time to be credible, a subgame consistency solution which requires the agreed-upon optimality principle to remain in effect throughout the collaboration duration has to hold. In this chapter, we present a cooperative dynamic game of collaborative environmental management with clean technology development. A subgame consistent cooperative scheme is derived. It is the first time that cooperative dynamic environmental games with clean technology development are analyzed. Given that there exist discrete choices of production techniques and switching to clean technology brings about cost savings and improved effectiveness, the group optimal solution cannot be obtained with standard differentiable optimization techniques. To overcome this problem the joint optimal solutions for all the possible patterns of production techniques are computed and the pattern with the highest joint payoff is then selected. The analysis widens the scope of study in collaborative environmental management.",
keywords = "Clean technology development, Cooperative dynamic games, Environmental management, Subgame consistency",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.",
year = "2019",
month = oct,
day = "14",
language = "English",
isbn = "9789811202001",
pages = "395--417",
booktitle = "Game Theoretic Analysis",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
address = "Singapore",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - A cooperative dynamic environmental game of subgame consistent clean technology development

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved.

PY - 2019/10/14

Y1 - 2019/10/14

N2 - Cooperative adoption and development of clean technology play a key role to effectively solving the continual worsening industrial pollution problem. For cooperation over time to be credible, a subgame consistency solution which requires the agreed-upon optimality principle to remain in effect throughout the collaboration duration has to hold. In this chapter, we present a cooperative dynamic game of collaborative environmental management with clean technology development. A subgame consistent cooperative scheme is derived. It is the first time that cooperative dynamic environmental games with clean technology development are analyzed. Given that there exist discrete choices of production techniques and switching to clean technology brings about cost savings and improved effectiveness, the group optimal solution cannot be obtained with standard differentiable optimization techniques. To overcome this problem the joint optimal solutions for all the possible patterns of production techniques are computed and the pattern with the highest joint payoff is then selected. The analysis widens the scope of study in collaborative environmental management.

AB - Cooperative adoption and development of clean technology play a key role to effectively solving the continual worsening industrial pollution problem. For cooperation over time to be credible, a subgame consistency solution which requires the agreed-upon optimality principle to remain in effect throughout the collaboration duration has to hold. In this chapter, we present a cooperative dynamic game of collaborative environmental management with clean technology development. A subgame consistent cooperative scheme is derived. It is the first time that cooperative dynamic environmental games with clean technology development are analyzed. Given that there exist discrete choices of production techniques and switching to clean technology brings about cost savings and improved effectiveness, the group optimal solution cannot be obtained with standard differentiable optimization techniques. To overcome this problem the joint optimal solutions for all the possible patterns of production techniques are computed and the pattern with the highest joint payoff is then selected. The analysis widens the scope of study in collaborative environmental management.

KW - Clean technology development

KW - Cooperative dynamic games

KW - Environmental management

KW - Subgame consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122226735&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85122226735

SN - 9789811202001

SP - 395

EP - 417

BT - Game Theoretic Analysis

PB - WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD

ER -

ID: 92315549