The article put forward a comparative analysis of the reaction of the British and French diplomats and military representatives on the revolutionary events in Russia in February-October 1917. The author defines the range of the most informed foreign observers and tries to appreciate the degree of their impact on the policy of London and Paris concerning Russia. He accentuates on how far these responses and estimates were determined by the position and the nature of activities of the representatives of the Allied Powers, as well as by their political preferences and prejudices. The author avoids to restrict himself by a mere digest of comments of foreign contemporaries of the Russian Revolution. He tends to put these responses into a broader context of efforts of the French and the British governments to keep their Eastern ally in the war. Above all else, the article addresses the issue of common and distinct in the “Russian policy” of the two countries, the degree of conformity and rivalry of the Western Powers in their attempts to influence the march of events in Russia. Estimates of the foreign representatives are traced in dynamics. They naturally evolved following the processes in Russia on the course “from bad to worse”: from anxiety in March-April caused by decline of the morale of the Russian Army to skepticism in June-July in anticipating of the planned offensive on the Eastern front and, finally, to disappointment and blow of all hopes regarding assistance from the part of Russian till the end of the campaign of 1917. The author also stresses surprising similarity of British diagnoses and flexibility of the “Russian policy” of France.