This article pretends to answer how Sino-Indian bilateral relations have been changing during the last decade and what role the existing border disputes play within this process. Attention is given to India’s perception of Chinese strategy in the South Asia region and the influence of Chinese-Pakistani ties on the shifts in regional balance of power. The author touches upon the subject of ‘cross-border terrorism’, promoted from the Pakistan soil against India, and its implications to the Sino-Indian relations. A stress is put on the significance of the Doklam Plateu standoff between India and China in 2017 and the reorganization of the Jammu and Kashmir state in 2019 which in turn led to new border skirmishes in Ladakh in 2020. It is concluded, that the incident in Galwan Valley in June 2020 was a turning point for the Modi’s government to choose tough foreign policy towards China. As a result, preserving the current status-quo in Ladakh is not anymore a mutual priority for the both countries. The boundary dispute seems to become principal defining factor in Sino-Indian bilateral relations, because of fundamental contradictions about the Line of actual control (LAC). At the same time, the existing confidence-building measures which are meant to facilitate cooperation along the LAC still preserve the sides from escalating border clashes. Moreover, substantial trade-economic dependence from China implies that New Delhi would prefer to avoid the use of force in resolving border disputes at the time. However, India could shift its traditional ‘strategic autonomy’ principles towards ‘soft balancing’ strategy in order to contain Beijing in the context of deepening contradictions with China. This could be partially confirmed by India’s growing rapprochement with the US and evolution of India’s participation in the Quad dialogue format, which has implicit anti-Chinese goals, or India’s promotion of the Indo-Pacific concept. Anyway, the issue of territorial contradictions will be crucial for New Delhi’s strategy towards the PRC in the short - and midterm.