The article deals with the impact of Platonism on early analytical logic and epistemology. The analytical philosophies emerge out of a controversy with Platonism and Idealism. The logical theory of naming in Plato’s Cratylus is of special interest here. The project of an ideal logical language seems to be philosophically grounded in Plato’s philosophy. The article focuses on the logical and epistemological ideas expounded in 1900-1940 by B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, A.N. Whitehead, A. Ayer, P.F. Strawson, etc. In the Cratylus, Plato writes on the strong naming of the entities that supposedly have non-logical existence. He assumes the existence of the world of what is “thinkable”, or of what we can speak about. Plato’s view is congenial to analytical theories of naming and description. Analytical philosophers consider the logical language of mathematical logic (for example, the language of the Principia Mathematica or the Tractatus) as the “ideal language” because of its apparent Platonist features: generality, universality, rationality, uniqueness, simplicity, etc. The main reason for their criticism of Plato’s logic lays in the epistemology of logical grounds. These grounds are facts, not ideas. Analytical philosophers mostly reject the theory of ideas. However, this is not their common view. Frege (theory of the “thinkable”) and Whitehead (theory of “eternal objects”) are rather congenial to Plato’s ontology. Analytical logical language is similar to the language of Plato’s logic. It is possible to agree with the interpretation of Russellian, Wittgensteinian and Fregean logic as “mathematical (semantical) Platonism”. Platonism and analytical philosophy are different in epistemology, but they arepractically identical in logic and philosophy of language.