TY - JOUR

T1 - Типология агентских моделей коррупции и кейс тоталитарной коррупции

AU - Иванов, Андрей Евгеньевич

AU - Березинец, Ирина Владимировна

N1 - Иванов, А. Е. Типология агентских моделей коррупции и кейс тоталитарной коррупции / А. Е. Иванов, И. В. Березинец // ВОПРОСЫ ЭКОНОМИКИ. - 2021. - № 9. - С. 109-131. Publisher Copyright: © 2021, Russian Presidental Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. All rights reserved.

PY - 2021/9/7

Y1 - 2021/9/7

N2 - The paper applies a typology of agency models of corruption, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the “ideal” preferences of society. The proposed approach has allowed to theoretically substantiate the existence of new models of corrupt behavior, quasi-and totalitarian corruption, and subsequently to reveal cases of such agents’ behavior in the public procurement practice. In conditions of inefficient regulation, developed by the mala fide principal, bona fide agents in an effort to best meet the needs of society may violate certain provisions of regulatory legal acts or regulatory policy principles (quasi-corruption) whilst the mala fide agents do the same things for bribes (efficient corruption). On the other hand, in some cases the agents have to act in accordance with the inefficient regulation, being deprived of the possibility to violate it (totalitarian corruption). In the paper, the discussion of assumptions of different models, presented in the typology, including quasi-and totalitarian corruption, has been found in the academic literature. The paper examines the hypothesis that the proposition of Russian single-source procurement regulation which directly restricts annual small purchasing of contracting authorities provokes totalitarian corrupt behavior of buyers making them use electronic reverse auctions instead of single-source procurement to award small contracts.

AB - The paper applies a typology of agency models of corruption, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the “ideal” preferences of society. The proposed approach has allowed to theoretically substantiate the existence of new models of corrupt behavior, quasi-and totalitarian corruption, and subsequently to reveal cases of such agents’ behavior in the public procurement practice. In conditions of inefficient regulation, developed by the mala fide principal, bona fide agents in an effort to best meet the needs of society may violate certain provisions of regulatory legal acts or regulatory policy principles (quasi-corruption) whilst the mala fide agents do the same things for bribes (efficient corruption). On the other hand, in some cases the agents have to act in accordance with the inefficient regulation, being deprived of the possibility to violate it (totalitarian corruption). In the paper, the discussion of assumptions of different models, presented in the typology, including quasi-and totalitarian corruption, has been found in the academic literature. The paper examines the hypothesis that the proposition of Russian single-source procurement regulation which directly restricts annual small purchasing of contracting authorities provokes totalitarian corrupt behavior of buyers making them use electronic reverse auctions instead of single-source procurement to award small contracts.

KW - Agency model

KW - Electronic reverse auction

KW - Public hospitals

KW - Public procurement

KW - Quasi-corruption

KW - Single-source procurement

KW - Totalitarian corruption

KW - Typology of corruption

KW - SCOPUS

KW - WOS

KW - РИНЦ

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115756996&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/7532c637-0aac-3c5f-a4f7-2170c45b9514/

U2 - 10.32609/0042-8736-2021-9-109-131

DO - 10.32609/0042-8736-2021-9-109-131

M3 - статья

SP - 109

EP - 131

JO - ВОПРОСЫ ЭКОНОМИКИ

JF - ВОПРОСЫ ЭКОНОМИКИ

SN - 0042-8736

IS - 9

ER -