Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
Sustainable Cooperation in Dynamic Games on Event Trees with Players’ Asymmetric Beliefs. / Parilina, Elena M.; Zaccour, Georges.
в: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Том 194, № 1, 07.2022, стр. 92-120.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Sustainable Cooperation in Dynamic Games on Event Trees with Players’ Asymmetric Beliefs
AU - Parilina, Elena M.
AU - Zaccour, Georges
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2022/7
Y1 - 2022/7
N2 - We built a time-consistent cooperative solution for the class of dynamic games played over event trees in the context where the tree structure is given, but the players have different beliefs about the transition probabilities between nodes. Our three-step approach is as follows. First, we consider three alternative methods for aggregating the players’ beliefs and assume that the players agree to adopt one of them if they decide to cooperate. Second, we determine the Nash bargaining outcomes for the whole duration of the game. Finally, to insure sustainability of cooperation throughout the whole duration of the game, we propose two time-consistent decompositions over nodes of each player’s cooperative share, namely a proportion-consistent and a node-consistent allocation schemes. We illustrate our results with a simple Cournot oligopoly with capacity constraints.
AB - We built a time-consistent cooperative solution for the class of dynamic games played over event trees in the context where the tree structure is given, but the players have different beliefs about the transition probabilities between nodes. Our three-step approach is as follows. First, we consider three alternative methods for aggregating the players’ beliefs and assume that the players agree to adopt one of them if they decide to cooperate. Second, we determine the Nash bargaining outcomes for the whole duration of the game. Finally, to insure sustainability of cooperation throughout the whole duration of the game, we propose two time-consistent decompositions over nodes of each player’s cooperative share, namely a proportion-consistent and a node-consistent allocation schemes. We illustrate our results with a simple Cournot oligopoly with capacity constraints.
KW - Asymmetric information
KW - Belief aggregation
KW - Event tree
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - S-adapted strategies
KW - Stochastic games
KW - CONSISTENT SHAPLEY VALUE
KW - STABILITY
KW - EQUILIBRIUM
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85125097888&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/e64c63a8-1188-365c-8729-b05b98ea0dc6/
U2 - 10.1007/s10957-022-02010-5
DO - 10.1007/s10957-022-02010-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85125097888
VL - 194
SP - 92
EP - 120
JO - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
SN - 0022-3239
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 93190097