Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs

Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференции

Аннотация

© 2015 IEEE. The problem of strategically supported cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games is considered. It is assumed, that the cooperative agreement is reached and each player gets his payoff according to the payoff distribution procedure [5]. Following [3], to punish those who violate this agreement, the special game, which differs from initial only by payoffs of players on cooperative trajectory is constructed. It is shown that in the new game there exists an ε-equilibrium with payoffs of players equal to corresponding payoffs of players in cooperative solution of initial game.
Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикации2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings
ИздательInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Страницы265-268
ISBN (печатное издание)9781467376983
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 2015

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Tur, A. (2015). Stable cooperation in linear-quadratic differential games with nontransferable payoffs. В 2015 International Conference on "Stability and Control Processes" in Memory of V.I. Zubov, SCP 2015 - Proceedings (стр. 265-268). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SCP.2015.7342110