@inbook{1017644b65c24d84b09f19d346bdeeee,
title = "On the Selection of the Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game of Pollution Control",
abstract = "The work is devoted to the problem of the selection of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative differential games with an n-dimensional state variable. We consider the problem of the control harmful emissions. When solving the problem in the class of closed-loop strategies it turns out that Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation may have multiple solutions. The application of an economic criterion and a classical method used in the theory of linear-quadratic regulators (LQR) to the selection of the admissible solutions from the set of obtained solutions was shown in the considered model.",
keywords = "Differential games, Feedback strategies, LQR, Linear-quadratic games, Multiple solutions, Selection of Nash equilibrium",
author = "Ekaterina Gromova and Yulia Lakhina",
note = "Gromova E., Lakhina Y. (2019) On the Selection of the Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game of Pollution Control. In: Petrosyan L., Mazalov V., Zenkevich N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkh{\"a}user, Cham",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_3",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783030236984",
series = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG",
pages = "37--48",
editor = "Petrosyan, {Leon A. } and Mazalov, {Vladimir V. } and Zenkevich, {Nikolay A. }",
booktitle = "Frontiers of Dynamic Games",
address = "Switzerland",
}