Выдержка
The work is devoted to the problem of the selection of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative differential games with an n-dimensional state variable. We consider the problem of the control harmful emissions. When solving the problem in the class of closed-loop strategies it turns out that Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation may have multiple solutions. The application of an economic criterion and a classical method used in the theory of linear-quadratic regulators (LQR) to the selection of the admissible solutions from the set of obtained solutions was shown in the considered model.
| Язык оригинала | английский |
|---|---|
| Название основной публикации | Frontiers of Dynamic Games |
| Редакторы | Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich |
| Место публикации | Cham |
| Издатель | Birkhäuser Verlag AG |
| Страницы | 37-48 |
| ISBN (электронное издание) | 9783030236991 |
| ISBN (печатное издание) | 9783030236984 |
| DOI | |
| Состояние | Опубликовано - 2019 |
Серия публикаций
| Название | Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications |
|---|---|
| ISSN (печатное издание) | 2363-8516 |
| ISSN (электронное издание) | 2363-8524 |
Предметные области Scopus
- Теория вероятности и статистика
- Статистика, теория вероятности и теория неопределенности
- Прикладная математика
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On the Selection of the Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game of Pollution Control. / Gromova, Ekaterina ; Lakhina, Yulia .
Frontiers of Dynamic Games. ред. / Leon A. Petrosyan; Vladimir V. Mazalov; Nikolay A. Zenkevich. Cham : Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. стр. 37-48 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).Результат исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел
TY - CHAP
T1 - On the Selection of the Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game of Pollution Control
AU - Gromova, Ekaterina
AU - Lakhina, Yulia
N1 - Gromova E., Lakhina Y. (2019) On the Selection of the Nash Equilibria in a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game of Pollution Control. In: Petrosyan L., Mazalov V., Zenkevich N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The work is devoted to the problem of the selection of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative differential games with an n-dimensional state variable. We consider the problem of the control harmful emissions. When solving the problem in the class of closed-loop strategies it turns out that Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation may have multiple solutions. The application of an economic criterion and a classical method used in the theory of linear-quadratic regulators (LQR) to the selection of the admissible solutions from the set of obtained solutions was shown in the considered model.
AB - The work is devoted to the problem of the selection of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative differential games with an n-dimensional state variable. We consider the problem of the control harmful emissions. When solving the problem in the class of closed-loop strategies it turns out that Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation may have multiple solutions. The application of an economic criterion and a classical method used in the theory of linear-quadratic regulators (LQR) to the selection of the admissible solutions from the set of obtained solutions was shown in the considered model.
KW - Differential games
KW - Feedback strategies
KW - LQR
KW - Linear-quadratic games
KW - Multiple solutions
KW - Selection of Nash equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073250595&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_3
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_3
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9783030236984
T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
SP - 37
EP - 48
BT - Frontiers of Dynamic Games
A2 - Petrosyan, Leon A.
A2 - Mazalov, Vladimir V.
A2 - Zenkevich, Nikolay A.
PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG
CY - Cham
ER -