Information is a strategic tool in many areas of the economics, business and social processes. Particularly, information can be considered as a control action in the problem of tax control. Following recent studies, we consider the auditing probabilities, which guarantee the absence of tax deviations, as the optimal strategies of the tax authority, however an employment of this strategy is unprofitable for tax authority and thus practically impossible. Therefore the dissemination of information on future tax audits over the taxable population can be offered as one of specific methods to stimulate people to pay taxes. Previously, it has been proofed that the process of information spreading resembles evolutionary dynamics in nature. Therefore, we consider a set of taxpayers as a population of interacted economic agents which intercommunicate with information/rumors. We design the propagation process as an imitation evolutionary dynamics over the structured population. We assume that it is more natural that agents will spread information or rumors over their own contact network, including neighbors and colleagues instead of randomly chosen agents. Thus in current study we investigate the imitation dynamics over the networks with different topology. We consider series of experiments where information spreads in the network of taxpayers with different topology and different modifications of bimatrix games to construct evolutionary dynamics describing the changes of agents behaviour. Numerical simulations give visualization of the information dissemination process over the different variant of the networks, imitation protocols and players payoffs. The results of simulations confirmed the influence of information on the final distribution of tax payments among the population with different levels of the risk propensity.